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Trade, Environment, and Sustainable
Development: A Primer
By ROBERT HOUSMAN and DURWOOD ZAELKE*
I. INTRODUCION
Free trade policy is designed to let markets allocate resources to
their most efficient uses, while environmental policy seeks to manage and
maintain the earth's resources efficiently. Conflicts can and do arise
where the same resources are subject to both trade efforts to allocate and
environmental efforts to manage and maintain. This conflict must be rec-
onciled; both trade and environmental policies are too important to let
conflicts persist. Yet many environmentalists still believe that the eco-
nomic system, including trade, is the enemy, and many trade and devel-
opment experts still believe that the environment is not a fundamental
part of the economy, but rather a luxury to be added on later, when and
if it can be afforded.
The trade and environmental communities have different back-
grounds and professional "cultures." Economic principles, such as effi-
ciency and comparative advantage, guide trade experts while
environmental experts are informed more by the biological sciences and
ecological principles.
On the other hand, most environmental professionals appreciate the
need to internalize environmental costs. Many now see that market-
based strategies often may be more efficient than command and control
strategies in achieving this goal. In addition to the common language of
cost internalization, both the trade and environmental cultures use law to
help implement their goals and to resolve disputes.
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U.S. and Adjunct Professor of Law, the Washington College of Law, the American University.
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Given time, it seems reasonable to expect that both trade and envi-
ronmental policy makers will adopt sustainable development as a legiti-
mate goal. As the Environmental Protection Agency's Trade and
Environment Committee noted last summer, "On the most fundamental
level, trade and environmental policy must meet in the concept of sus-
tainable development. Both trade policy and environmental policy must
serve that concept as their ultimate goal." 1
The problem, of course, is that time is running out. By the middle
of the twenty-first century world population is expected to double to ten
billion people, and the world economy of sixteen trillion dollars may
reach eighty trillion dollars.2 Scientists have detected record levels of the
ozone-depleting chemical chlorine monoxide over the New England re-
gion of the United States and Canada. This discovery raises fears that a
new hole in the ozone layer may be opening, exposing large numbers of
people to harmful levels of ultraviolet radiation.3 Assuming that the
present rate of growth in greenhouse gases remains constant, we may
have already committed the earth to a mean global warming of between 3
degrees and 8 degrees Farenheit (1.5 degrees to 4.5 degrees Celsius).4
Even with the most optimistic projections of technological advance-
ment, these growth trends in population and the economy almost cer-
tainly cannot be sustained. Still more troubling is that the scale of
today's development already appears to be overextending the ecosystem
that sustains us all. "Further growth beyond the present scale," accord-
ing to World Bank senior economist Herman Daly, "is overwhelmingly
likely to increase costs more rapidly than it increases benefits, thus usher-
ing in a new era of uneconomic growth that impoverishes rather than
1. See EPA Trade and Environment Committee, Minutes of Aug. 5, 1991 Meeting, Aug.
6, 1991, at 1 (unpublished minutes on file with CIEL-US). The GATT Secretariat has, how-
ever, denied any linkage between trade and the achievement of sustainable development. See
GATT Secretariat, Trade and the Environment 3 (undated advance copy on file with the au-
thors) [hereinafter GATT Secretariat, Trade and the Environment). The GATT Secratariat
views trade as a mere "magnifier" of the existing policies. Id. Thus, if a country has sustaina-
ble policies in place, trade will promote them. Id. "Alternatively, if such policies are lacking,
the country's international trade may contribute to a skewing of the country's development in
an environmentally damaging direction, but then so will most of the other economic activities
in the country." Id. The Secretariat does not view this "magnifier" effect as a direct causal
relationship between trade and the goal of sustainable development. Id.
2. See GEORGE HEATON ET AL., TRANSFORMING TECHNOLOGY: AN AGENDA FOR EN-
VIRONMENTALLY SUSTAINABLE GROWTH IN THE 21ST CENTURY 1 (1991).
3. See Cathy Sawyer, Ozone-Hole Conditions Spreading, WASH. POST, Feb. 4, 1992, at
Al.
4. See Dean Edwin Abrahamson, Global Warming: The Issue, Impacts, Responses, In
THE CHALLENGE OF GLOBAL WARMING 10 (Dean Edwin Abrahamson ed., 1989).
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enriches."5 Daly believes that "[t]his is the fundamental wild fact that so
far has not found expression in words sufficiently feral to assault success-
fully the civil stupor of economic discourse. "6
As the critical scientific and policy debate about the limits of the
ecosystem continues, it is necessary to reconcile the legal relationships
between trade agreements and environmental agreements. They cannot
remain at odds if we are to achieve sustainable development and long-
term international economic prosperity. Accordingly, this Article
surveys provisions within the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT)7 and other trade agreements relevant to environmental con-
cerns. It then reviews several international environmental agreements
and U.S. laws for possible friction with those trade provisions. The Arti-
cle concludes by briefly discussing issues and options for reducing or
eliminating such friction.
II. PROVISIONS WITHIN TRADE AGREEMENTS
RELEVANT TO ENVIRONMENTAL
AGREEMENTS AND CONCERNS
The GATT provides the legal framework under which almost all
trade among nations occurs. A number of regional (e.g., the European
Free Trade Association) and bilateral trade agreements (e.g., the United
States-Canada Free Trade Agreement) co-exist with the GATT.
GATT and these other agreements seek to provide a secure and pre-
dictable international trading environment while fostering greater eco-
nomic efficiency and growth through trade liberalization. The GATT's
preamble accordingly recognizes "that... trade and economic endeavor
5. HERMAN DALY & JOHN COBB, FOR THE COMMON GOOD: REDIRECTING THE
ECONOMY TOWARDS COMMUNITY, THE ENVIRONMENT, AND A SUSTAINABLE FUTURE 2
(1989).
6. Idk
7. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat.
A3, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter GATT]. GAIT was signed in 1947 by 23 countries and its
rules, which provide the basic structural framework in which trade and environment issues
interact, went into force on January 1, 1948. The United States became a contracting party to
GATIT by executive agreement and proclamation. See Protocol of Provisional Application of
the General Agreement on Tax on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. pt. 6, at A2051, 55
U.N.T.S. 308; Proclamation No. 2761A, 12 Fed. Reg. 8863 (1947). Despite the fact that the
Senate has never explicitly consented to GAIT, nor has Congress formally approved or imple-
mented the agreement, GATT is generally accepted as a binding treaty obligation of the
United States. See John H. Jackson, Changing GATT Rules (Nov. 7, 1991) (memorandum to
the Trade and Environment Committee of the EPA); Robert Hudec, The Legal Status of
GA 7T in the Domestic Law of the United States, in THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND GAIT
187, 199 (Meinhard Hllf et al. ed., 1986).
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should be conducted with a view to raising standards of living,... devel-
oping the full use of the resources of the world and expanding the pro-
duction and exchange of goods .... 8 Free trade proponents argue that
utilizing the "comparative advantage" of individual countries maximizes
the welfare of all. The economic activity spawned by trade, however, has
both positive and negative consequences for the environment when
viewed in the context of sustainable development.
A. GATT
The GATT consists of three major parts: Part I (articles I to III)
which contains the most-favored-nation and tariff concession obligations;
Part II (articles III to XXIII), sometimes referred to as the "code of
conduct," which contains the majority of the GATT's substantive provi-
sions and the exceptions to its obligations; and Part III (articles XXIX to
XXXVIII), which contains the procedural mechanisms for implementing
the other obligations and provisions contained within the GATT.9
1. GATT's General Trade Principles and Their Environmental
Implications
a. The Most-Favored-Nation-Principle
Article I's most-favored-nation principle (MFN) ensures that the
contracting parties do not discriminate among imported products on the
basis of their national origin. The MFN obligation requires that each
contracting party extend immediately and unconditionally any privilege
or advantage it provides to a product to like products from, or destined
for, all GATT contracting parties. The MFN obligation applies to: 1)
customs, duties, and charges related to imports and exports; 2) the meth-
ods of levying all such duties and charges; 3) rules, regulations, and pro-
cedures connected with importation and exportation; and 4) internal
taxes, charges, laws, regulations, restrictions, and rules affecting the in-
ternal sale or offering for sale, purchase, transportation, warehousing or
storage, distribution, or use of a product.10
Because the MFN principle requires that the parties treat all like
products equally, it seemingly prohibits a contracting party from using
trade restrictions to address the differences in environmental soundness.
8. GATT, supra note 7, pmbl., 61 Stat. at All.
9. See JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LAW AND POLICY OF IN-
TERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 40 (1989).
10. See GATT, supra note 7, art. 1, 61 Stat. at A12; see also Jeanne J. Grimmett, Environ-
mental Regulation and the GA7T, Aug. 1991, at 3-4 Cong. Res. Service, No. 91-285-A (1991).
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Such differences may be caused by differences in production process
methods (PPMs) that exist between like products originating from na-
tions with high environmental standards and from nations with low envi-
ronmental standards or lax enforcement."1 Thus, an importation ban-
such as the European Community's ban on animal furs caught with
leghold traps-or a tax on a product of one contracting party, imposed
because the PPM used in creating that product was environmentally
harmful, would appear to run afoul of the MFN.12
Additionally, the MFN obligation has been found to apply to label-
ing schemes that are not marks of origin, including "eco-labeling" re-
gimes. 3 Therefore, government labeling requirements relating to PPMs
that grant market access or indirectly provide market advantages may
also conflict with this GATT provision.
b. The National Treatment Principle
Article III's national treatment principle requires that a contracting
party treat like foreign and domestic products equally once they have
met tariffs and other import requirements. 4 Additionally, article III re-
quires that any measure taken under its guise may not be applied to pro-
tect the domestic industry.
As the GATT Secretariat has noted so eloquently:
Production and consumption activities in other countries can also be a
source of domestic environmental concern. Pollution may be spilling
over borders and harming either the regional environment (acid rain)
11. See GAIT Secretariat, Trade and the Environment, supra note 1, at 10 ("In principle,
it is not possible under GATT's rules to make access to one's own domestic market dependent
on the domestic environmental policies or practices of the exporting country."); Grimmett,
supra note 10, at 16; WORLD WILDLIFE FOUNDATION, THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TAR-
IFFS AND TRADE, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 12
(1991) [hereinafter WWF]; ROBERT REPETTo, ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES IN RELATION TO
GAT 1 (1991).
12. See supra note 11; Council Regulation 3254/91, 1991 OJ. (L 308) 1-2.
13. United States--Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, 50-51, GATT Doc. DS21/R (Sept. 3,
1991) (finding inter alia that certain provisions of U.S. law that protect dolphin in the Eastern
Tropical Pacific Ocean, as applied to imports of Mexican tuna, violated the United States
obligations under GATT) [hereinafter Tuna/Dolphin Panel Report]; see also generally Robert
Housman & Durwood Zaelke, The Collision of the Environment and Trade The GATT Tuna/
Dolphin Decision, 22 ENVrL. L. REP. 10,268, 10,273-74 (1992). The Tuna/Dolphin Panel
upheld the particular labeling provisions before the panel because the provisions allowed sup-
pliers of dolphin-safe tuna the option of disclosing its environmental character, but did not
require unsafe or safe tuna to bear certain labeling to be sold. Tuna/Dolphin Panel Report,
supra, at 51. The panel implied that if the labeling requirements had required certain PPM
labeling, they would have violated the GATT. Id
14. See GATT, supra note 7, art. III, 61 Stat. at A18.
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or the global commons (ozone depletion). Or land development
projects may be threatening the extinction of an animal or plant spe-
cies, and uncontrolled fishing may be depleting fish stock in the high
seas. It is not unreasonable that the government of a country con-
cerned by such practices would seek to see them changed-and that it
would find it difficult to accept that this would not be possible.... In
principle it is not possible under GATT's rules to make access to one's
own market dependent on the domestic environmental policies or prac-
tices of the exporting country. 15
Article III as applied appears to prohibit a nation from applying
tariffs, levies, or other import restrictions to protect the competitiveness
of a domestic industry that internalizes environmental costs in its prod-
uct cost. Foreign competitors whose product costs do not reflect the en-
vironmental costs associated with the production of their products may
gain a competitive advantage over the domestic products. 16
While article III restricts a contracting party from imposing differ-
ent regulations on imported products than on domestic products, article
III does allow a contracting party to impose the same internal regula-
tions applying to domestic products upon imported products at their
point of importation. In order to qualify as a "point of importation regu-
lation," the regulation must further apply directly to the product (i.e., it
must alter or affect the physical or chemical makeup of the product). 17
A restriction failing to qualify as a point of importation regulation is a
quantitative restriction and thus violates GATT's general obligations.
Thus, a contracting party that distinguishes among imported products
based on the environmental soundness of the exporting party's PPMs is
vulnerable to attack under article III.18
While article III allows point of importation regulations, it has been
read narrowly to permit only those restrictions that apply directly to, or
affect the physical and/or chemical composition of, the product in ques-
tion. 9 It is as yet unclear as to what level of effect article III would
require a regulation to make in the product. For example, must a regula-
15. GATT Secretariat, Trade and the Environment, supra note I, at 8-10 (emphasis in the
original).
16. GATT Secretariat, Trade and the Environment, supra note 1, at 11; Tuna/Dolphin
Panel Report, supra note 13, at 50; see also Grimmett, supra note 10, at 16; WWF, supra note
11, at 12.
17. See supra note 14 and accompanying text. This provision raises the issue as to
whether required product content labeling requirements, that relate to, but do not affect the
content of a product, could violate article III.
18. Housman & Zaelke, supra note 13, at 10,276.
19. Tuna/Dolphin Panel Report, supra note 13, at 41.
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tion affect the content, appearance, value, or performance of a product in
order to fall within article III? If a content difference is required, it is
unclear whether, and to what degree, the difference must be discernable.
This limitation appears to exclude from article III point of importation
regulations all environmental regulations that govern the PPM of a prod-
uct, as opposed to the product itself.20 Even those environmental pro-
duction process standards that encourage efficiency and free trade, such
as Canadian regulations requiring paper products to contain a certain
percentage of recycled materials, could be found to violate the prohibi-
tion on PPM regulations.21 Because Canada lacks a sufficient supply of
recyclable wastes, these paper product regulations would actually en-
courage increased free trade.'
Similarly, to qualify for article III treatment, a point of importation
regulation must apply equally to "like" domestic and imported prod-
ucts. 3 But there is no guide as to how to determine when similar prod-
ucts are "like" products. For example, the European Community's ban
on beef produced using hormones restricted the importation of both beef
produced with natural hormones and beef produced with synthetic hor-
mones.24 Beef produced with synthetic hormones may not be "like" beef
made without hormones. Beef made with artificially-provided natural
hormones, however, has no chemicals not found in beef made without
20. See Grimmett, supra note 10, at 16; Frederick L. Kirgis Jr., Effective Pollution Control
in Industrialized Countriexr International Economic Disincentives Policy Responses. and the
GAT, 70 MICH. L. REv. 860, 893-901 (1972); WWF, supra note 11, at 12, Durwood Zacike
et al., Frictions Between International Trade Agreements and Environmental Protections 3
(1992) (paper prepared for the Trade & Env't Comm., Nat'l Advisory Council on Env't Policy
& Technology, EPA) [hereinafter Frictions Between International Trade Agreements and En-
vironmental Protections]. If, however, a PPM has an effect on the product, then the PPM may
be GATT consistent. PPMs that do not actually effect the product are not, unless otherwise
provided for, consistent with GATT.
21. Imposition of Recycled Paper Regulations Would Force Imports From U.S. Industry
Says, 14 Int'l Envtl. Rep. (BNA) 462, 462-63 (1991) [hereinafter Imposition of Recycled Paper
Regulations]. While the Canadian regulation appears to regulate the content of the paper, i.e.
it requires a certain percentage of the material to be derived from recycled materials, unless
there is a discernable difference between paper made from recycled materials and that made
from virgin materials, the regulation will be deemed a production process regulation. See also
Joint Session of Trade and Environment Experts, Organization for Economic Cooperation &
Development, The Applicability of the GA2T to Trade and Environmental Concerns 13, COM/
ENV/EC/TD (91) 66 (Oct. 24, 1991) [hereinafter OECD, Joint Session] (noting the distinc-
tion between PPMs that affect the product and those PPMs that do not affect the product is
often times a difficult, yet seminal, distinction). If a content difference is required, it is unclear
to what extent that difference must be discernable.
22. See Imposition of Recycled Paper Regulations, supra note 21.
23. See GATT, supra note 7, art. HI, 62 Stat. at 3680.
24. See Council Directive 88/146, 1988 O.J. (L 70) 16.
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hormones. The only differences between the natural hormone-fortified
beef and the all-natural beef is the level of hormones present and the way
these hormones came to be present. Whether natural hormone-fortified
beef and all-natural beef are "like" products and must be regulated simi-
larly or are not "like" products and may be regulated differently, is
unclear.
c. The Prohibition of Quantitative Restrictions
GATT article XI prohibits quantitative restrictions such as quotas,
bans, and licensing schemes on imported or exported products. Article
XI contains several narrow exceptions that allow departure from this
general proscription, such as the application of standards to internation-
ally-sold commodities and agricultural products. 25 Even when the ex-
ceptions permit a quantitative restriction, the contracting parties must
still observe the MFN and national treatment obligations in implement-
ing it.
26
Applying the strict prohibition against quantitative restrictions can
hamper environmental initiatives that are not directly intended to be pro-
tectionist devices in the common sense of the term. By broadly prohibit-
ing non-tariff barriers, the ban on quantitative restrictions also prohibits
a contracting party from instituting environmental restrictions such as a
conservation ban or limit imposed on exports of resources (unless the ban
can be justified as an article XX exception).27 Examples of environmen-
tal protections that could conflict with the prohibition of quantitative
measures include the United States law banning the exportation of old
growth timber harvested from federal lands.28
While the quantitative restriction prohibition may restrict the policy
options available to a contracting party, such constraints sometimes pro-
25. See GATr, supra note 7, art. XI(2), 61 Stat. at A33. Other than through article XI's
specific exemptions, the only way a quantitative restriction can conrorm with the GATIT Is by
falling within one of the public policy exceptions set out in article XX.
26. See GATT, supra note 7, art. XIII, 61 Stat. at A40, art. XIV, 61 Stat. at A43 for
extensive prescriptions regarding the non-discriminatory administration of quantitative
restrictions.
27. See Grimmett, supra note 10, at 19; WWF, supra note 11, at 14. Article XX's excep-
tions are discussed infra at notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
28. 16 U.S.C. §§ 620(a), (c), (e), 489(a), 491(a), 493(5) (Supp. 11990); see also Logging on
Protectionism, WALL ST. J., Sept. 6, 1990, at A14; Dori Jones Yung, Weyerhauser's Exports:
An Endangered Species, Bus. WK., July 16, 1990, at 51. The Forest Resources Conservation
and Shortage Relief Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-382, (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 488(b)(3), (5)
(Supp. 11990)) is intended "to ensure sufficent supplies of certain forest resources or products
which are essential to the United States" while simultaneously requiring that actions taken to
meet this objective conform with the obligations of the U.S. under GATT.
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vide an environmental benefit. In some instances the trade distortions
caused by imposing quantitative restrictions can exacerbate the very en-
vironmental harms the trade measures were intended to minimize or
eliminate. The Indonesian ban on exports of unprocessed timber pro-
vides an illustration. The intent of the Indonesian ban was to remove
development pressures causing the unsustainable use of dwindling forest
resources. In practice, the export ban has been cited as having caused a
discriminatory preference to accrue to local, inefficient sawmills, yielding
a lower rate of output per unit of log input, resulting in increased levels
of environmental degradation.2 9
2. Other GATT Articles and Their Impact on Environmental
Agreements and Concerns
In addition to the GATT's general principles, many of the GATT's
other articles could cause friction between trade and environmental
policies.
a. Article I- Maximum Tariff Barriers
Article II establishes the negotiated maximum tariff levels, as pro-
vided in the accompanying annexes to the GATT, for national prod-
ucts.3" This article also prohibits the imposition of import surcharges by
exempting the scheduled items from all other duties and/or charges im-
posed in connection with importation. Article II(2)(a), however, pro-
vides exceptions to the maximum tariff levels for: 1) any charge imposed
29. See Carlos Alberto Primo Braga, Tropical Forests and Trade Policy: The Cases of
Indonesia and Brazil 19 (1991) (paper presented at the Symposium on Int'l Trade & the Envt,
sponsored by Int'l Trade Division, Int'l Economics Dep't, World Bank). Despite the quantifi-
able short-term environmental harms from the Indonesian export ban, the long-term environ-
mental effects--including the environmental gains made through the reduction of poverty
from increased profits to the local areas of production-of the ban are difficult to quantify. See
ROBERT REPETro, THE FOREST FOR THE TREES? GOVERNMENT POLICIES AND THE MIS-
USE OF FOREST RESOURCES (World Resources Institute ed., 1988).
From the Indonesian experience, one scholar argues that the failure of trade policies to
create environmental protections in Indonesia demonstrates that trade policies are, generally,
not an appropriate vehicle for creating environmental protections. See Braga, supra. Factual
nuances, however, make it difficult to extrapolate the overall effectiveness of trade restrictions
in creating environmental protections from this one example and work against this scholar's
conclusion. Whether or not trade policies are actually appropriate mechanisms for crafting
environmental protections, the ability of the author to draw this conclusion from the isolated
example of Indonesia's ban on unfinished timber exports must be questioned. The Indonesian
example involved the unilateral use of export bans that resulted in protections being given to
inefficent local industries that, in the absence of any domestic conservation intiatives, had no
incentive to increase their long-term sustainable production capabilities. See id.
30. See GATT, supra note 7, art. II, 61 Stat. at A13.
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on an import, consistent with the national treatment principle, that is
equivalent to an internal tax imposed on the like domestic product or
articles from which the like domestic and imported products are derived;
2) antidumping or countervailing duties applied consistent with the
GATT; and 3) fees or charges, in accordance with article VII (valuations
for customs purposes), commensurate with the costs of services
rendered.31
In essence, article II in its current form is environmentally neutral.
While article II does not provide a mechanism that would allow environ-
mental regulations to satisfy the GATT's other obligations, article II
does not prohibit the use of antidumping measures or countervailing du-
ties to equalize the environmental standards subsidy provided to the in-
dustries of nations with lower environmental standards, nor does it bar
the application of internal environmental regulations to imported prod-
ucts at the point of importation.32
The only deviation from the environmental neutrality of article II
occurs in the case of products that appear on the article's annexed lists of
scheduled items. If a product is listed, such as tropical timber, then a
contracting party cannot levy new import taxes or other charges on the
products, such as a sustainable use tax, that does not conform with the
listed negotiated charges.33
b. Article VL" Antidumping and Countervailing Duties
Article VI condemns the practice of dumping-when one con-
tracting party introduces products into the markets of another con-
tracting party at less than the normal value of the products-if it causes
or threatens material harm to a domestic industry or retards the estab-
lishment of a domestic industry.34 Article VI also sets the ground rules
by which contracting parties may impose antidumping duties on im-
ported products and may apply countervailing duties to offset bounties or
subsidies relating to imported products.3 5 The Subsidies Code negotiated
in the Tokyo Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations significantly
elaborates upon the scope and details of article VI.
31'
31. See id. art. 11(2), 61 Stat. at A13.
32. As has been explained, however, other provisions of GAT', such as the MFN and
article II, would likely bar such environmental regulation.
33. See REPETrO, supra note 11, at 1.
34. See GATr, supra note 7, art. VI, 61 Stat. at A23.
35. Id.
36. An analysis of the environmental implications of article VI and article XVI regarding
subsidies can be found infra in section II.3.b.
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c. Article X Transparency and Equal Access to Review Processes
Article X requires transparency (that is, public access) in publishing
and administering all regulations affecting trade.37 This requirement ap-
plies to all laws, regulations, rules, judicial and administrative rulings of
general or precedential application to requirements, restrictions or
prohibitions, on imports or exports, or affecting the sale, offering for sale,
purchase, distribution, transportation, insurance, warehousing, inspec-
tion, exhibition, processing, mixing or other use, of such imports or ex-
ports.3 8 In addition, article X requires transparency and equal access to
judicial and administrative review procedures related to such actions
and/or requirements.
Article X grants importers and exporters equal access to informa-
tion and review processes of contracting parties with regard to trade. Ar-
ticle X does not, however, provide affected citizens or consumers access
to information or recourse to review procedures when imports or exports
allegedly cause them environmental harm. Moreover, the transparency
requirements in article X do not apply to the GATT's own information
and review processes.
d. Article XII and Article XIIL" Developing Countries Balance of
Payment
Article XII, as elaborated in the Declaration on Trade Measures
Taken for Balance of Payment Purposes from the Tokyo round, and arti-
cle XIII provide certain limited exceptions to the other GATT obliga-
tions for import restrictions imposed by developing countries as a result
of their concern over their balance of payments.3 9
The developing country allowances in articles XII and XIII give
developing nations greater leeway in enacting measures to protect nas-
cent industries. This increased leeway can assist these nations in achiev-
ing sustainable patterns of growth by minimizing pressures on fledgling
industries to overutilize natural resources in order to ensure their short-
term survival.
e. Article XVI Subsidies
Article XVI embodies the GATT's general aversion to trade-dis-
torting subsidies. While article XVI does not itself prohibit the use of
such subsidies, its provisions form the basis of the challenge and counter-
37. See GATT, supra note 7, art. X, 61 Stat. at A30-31.
38. See id.
39. See id. art. XII, 61 Stat. at A34, art. XIII, 61 Stat. at A40.
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vailing duties provisions developed in the GATT Subsidies Code.40
f. Article XIX. Emergency Measures Provisions
Article XIX allows a contracting party to impose emergency trade
restrictions to protect a domestic industry that is seriously threatened by
imports.41 If an environmental regulation so burdens a domestic indus-
try as to place it in jeopardy, article XIX allows the contracting party to
adopt measures to protect its industry. The procedural and political bur-
dens of invoking article XIX, however, significantly diminish its value as
a bridge between trade and environmental concerns.
g. Article XX Policy Exceptions
Article XX establishes limited exceptions to the contracting parties'
general obligations under the GATT for measures based on national pol-
icy considerations.42 These exceptions do not exempt measures that con-
stitute arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries or that
are disguised restrictions on international trade. In a challenge to a con-
tracting party's action, the party seeking to invoke article XX to justify a
departure from the GATT's general obligations bears the burden of prov-
ing that the action: 1) was justified and not arbitrarily applied; and 2) was
proportional in scope (i.e., "necessary") to the concern giving rise to the
action so as to meet the objectives of the exceptions.43
i. Article XX(b): Human, Animal, and Plant Life or Health
Article XX(b) provides an exception for measures "necessary to
protect human, animal or plant life or health." 44 The Tuna/Dolphin
Panel held that article XX(b)'s exception is available only for health,
safety, and preservation initiatives within a contracting party's jurisdic-
tion, and not within the global commons (or within the jurisdiction of a
third party state).
45
40. See id art. XVI, 61 Stat. at A51. The provisions of the Subsidies Code, and their
environmental implications, are further elaborated on infra section 1I.3.b.
41. Id. art. XIX, 61 Stat. at A58.
42. Id. art. XX, 61 Stat. at A60-61.
43. Id art. XX, 61 Stat. at A60-61; see also Piritta Sorsa, GATI" and Environment: Basic
Issues and Some Developing Country Concerns (1991) (paper presented at the Symposium on
Int'l Trade & the Env't, sponsored by Int'l Trade Division, Int'l :Economics Dep't, World
Bank).
44. Id. art. XX(l)(b), 61 Stat. at A61.
45. See Tuna/Dolphin Panel Report, supra note 13, at 45-46. It is, however, unclear from
the Panel's report whether this jurisdictional limitation applies to the scope of the party's
action, or to the location of the individual or species protected. The Panel based its finding
that article XX(1)(b) did not extend "extrajurisdictionally" upon a somewhat erroneous un-
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The GATT" dispute panel report addressing Thai restrictions and
taxes on imported cigarettes interpreted the term "necessary" as used in
article XX(b) to require that: 1) no reasonably available alternative mea-
sure consistent with the GAIT existed, and 2) the measure taken was the
least trade restrictive measure of all available alternatives. 6 Elaborating
on these requirements, the Tuna/Dolphin Panel Report noted that the
United States had not demonstrated to the Panel-as required of a party
invoking an article XX exception-that it had exhausted all options rea-
sonably available to it to pursue its dolphin protection objectives through
measures consistent with the GAT, including, in particular, the negoti-
ation of international cooperative arrangements relating to dolphin pro-
tection.47 Moreover, even assuming that an import prohibition was the
only measure reasonably available to the United States, the panel felt that
the United States' measure could not be considered necessary within the
meaning of article XX(b) because of its unpredictable application.48
The limitations that recent GATT dispute panel reports have placed
on the use of article XX(b) negatively impact many measures currently
proposed by environmental groups. The goal of article XX(b) is to pro-
vide the contracting parties with the ability to take measures they feel are
necessary to preserve and protect the lives of humans, animals, and plant
derstanding of the negotiating history of the article. Cf. Steve Charnovitz, Exploring the Envi-
ronmental Exceptions in GA77 Article XX, 25 J. OF WORLD TRADE 37, 38-47 (1991)
(providing an excellent discussion of the negotiating history of article XX). Because the
Tuna/Dolphin Panel Report has not. as yet, been adopted by the contracting parties, the deci-
sion is not binding. Absent any changes to the GATT, it is likely, however, that if a future
panel was confronted with similar issues, the panel would apply the same reasoning as the
Tuna/Dolphin Panel.
46. Thailand - Restrictions on Importation of and Internal Taxes on Cigarettes, Report of
the Panel adopted 7 November 1990, BISD (37th Supp.) 200-23 para. 74 (1990) (in a dispute
concerning Thai prohibitions on the importation or exportation of tobacco and tobacco prod-
ucts the panel held that, although smoking constituted a serious risk to human health, Thai-
land's measures were not necessary for protecting human life because alternative measures,
consistent with the GAT, could have been adopted instead).
47. See Tuna/Dolphin Panel Report, supra note 13, at 46. Unfortunately, the Tuna/
Dolphin Panel failed to recognize that the United States and the other ETP nations have been
involved in ongoing efforts to reach an agreement on the conservation of dolphin since the
1970s. See INTER-AMERICAN TROPICAL TUNA COMMISSION, 1977 ANNUAL REPORT 8-9
(1978); INTER-AMERCAN TROPICAL TUNA COMMISSION, 1987 ANNUAL REPORT 8-9 (1988).
48. Tuna/Dolphin Panel Report, supra note 13, at 46. The United States had linked the
maximum incidental dolphin taking rate which the Mexican tuna fleet had to meet during a
particular period to be able to export tuna to the United States to the taking rate actually
recorded for U.S. tuna fleet during the same period. Consequently, the Panel believed that
Mexican authorities could not know whether, at a given point of time, their policies conformed
to the United States' dolphin protection standards. The Panel considered that a limitation on
trade based on such unpredictable conditions could not be regarded as "necessary" to protect
the health or life of dolphins. Ia
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species. Thus, article XX(b) would allow a ban, for example, on import-
ing a product that was hazardous to life or health."9 Although article
XX(b) still allows a safe haven for many important environmental initia-
tives by limiting the application of the exception to domestic restrictions
and by placing added requirements on the term "necessary," recent panel
decisions have diminished the ability of article XX(b) to reconcile envi-
ronmental and international trade policies and laws. First, for a restric-
tion to be "necessary" under article XX(b), according to the Tuna/
Dolphin Panel, the restriction must be preceded by an effort to forge an
international agreement to create the environmental protection desired.5"
This requirement creates an obstacle to environmental protections be-
cause it substantially hinders the ability of the contracting parties to take
unilateral actions, actions which frequently serve an important role in
forcing the evolution of environmental protections gained from interna-
tional agreements.51 Moreover, the Tuna/Dolphin Panel decision's re-
quiring what is essentially a good faith attempt to enter into an
agreement restricts the ability of contracting parties to act quickly when
they perceive a developing environmental threat, given the typically
lengthy period of time needed to negotiate an international agreement.
Second, the Tuna/Dolphin Panel's decision creates uncertainties as
to the extent to which a contracting party's environmental standard-set-
ting must be justified. One reading provides that by forcing contracting
parties to set their environmental measures at a fixed level of protection
"necessary" to achieve the goal of the exception, which is the preserva-
tion and protection of the species, the panel implicitly equates some de-
gree of scientific certainty with "necessity." Adopting this approach
obviously would limit the ability of the contracting parties to take pre-
cautionary actions in the face of the scientific uncertainty that often tem-
pers early analyses of environmental threats.52 This limitation appears to
49. See Grimmett, supra note 10, at 19. Such a ban could still be challenged as a disguised
restriction on trade and would receive careful scrutiny under the necessity standards discussed
in this section. Id; see also GATT, GATI AcTIvrIas 1989, at 100-01 (1990) (discussing
Chile's response to a United States ban on certain Chilean grapes and grape products).
50. See Tuna/Dolphin Panel Report, supra note 13, at 46.
51. See GATT Secretariat, Trade and the Environment, supra note 1, at 25 (discussing the
success of unilateral environmentally-based trade restrictions, such as the U.S. threatened ban
on Japanese imports of hawksbill sea turtles shells, in affecting other nations' behavior).
52. A prime example of a threat whose abatement could be hindered by a required degree
of scientific uncertainty is global warming. Despite general scientific agreement that global
warming is occurring, the sheer complexity of the problem makes uncertain what results or
threats global warming will produce. See generally Durwood Zaelke 8: James Cameron, Global
Warming and Climate Change: An Overview of the International Legal Process, 5 AM. U. J.
INT'L L. & POL'Y 249 (1990) If a high degree of scientific certainty is required to meet article
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conflict with the internationally recognized precautionary principle that
has developed in the field of international environmental law. 3
An alternative, and somewhat less restrictive, reading of the panel's
"necessity" standard provides that the panel primarily based its concern
with the U.S. standard on the arbitrary nature of the trade measure and
not on the underlying environmental protection. 54 Under this reading, as
long as the trade measure effectuating an environmental protection is not
arbitrary, i.e., is set at a definitive and predictable level, article XX(b) is
not concerned with the scientific justifications for the underlying environ-
mental policy.
Third, the panel found that article XX(b) did not extend to the "ex-
trajurisdictional" measures of a contracting party.55 This jurisdictional
XX's necessity requirement, contracting parties will find it difficult to make such showings and
will be hindered in their ability to combat global warming and other problems that require a
precautionary approach.
53. See Lothar Giindling, The Status in International Law of the Principle of Precaution-
ary Action, 5 INTL J. oF ESTUARINE & COASTAL L 23 (1990); Margaret Spring, Fish or
Famine: International Fisheries Management and the Precautionary Principle (1992) (paper
prepared for CIEL-US).
54. See Tuna/Dolphin Panel Report, supra note 13, at 45.
55. See iad The panel conspicuously fails to use the term "territorial" in describing the
parameters of article XX(1)(b). While the Panel's decision on the limits of a party's jurisdic-
tional ability to act is unclear, it is possible that an action taken extraterritorially, but within
the jurisdiction of a contracting party, falls within article XX. This raises the significant issue
as to what are the "jurisdictional" limitations on a nation's actions. There are a number of
different bases that provide a state with the jurisdiction to prescribe law. See REsTATEMFNT
(rHRD) oF THE FoREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 402 (basis of juris-
diction to prescribe), 404 (universal jurisdiction) (1990). Section 402 of the Restatement
provides:
Subject to [the limitations on a state's jurisdiction set out in] § 403 a state has the
jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect to
(1)(a) conduct that, wholly or in substantial part, takes place within its territory;
(b) the status of persons, or interests in things, present within its territory;
(c) conduct outside its territory that has or is intended to have substantial effect
within its territory;
(2) the activities, interests, status, or relations of its nationals outside as well as
within its territory; and
(3) certain conduct outside its territory by persons not its nationals that is directed
against the security of the state or against a limited class of security interests.
Id § 402.
Section 403 limits these jurisdictional bases in cases where the exercise of jurisdiction is
unreasonable based on a list of factors, including, for example, the extent of the link between
the territory of the state and the act in question, and "the likelihood of conflicts with regula-
tions of another state." Id § 403(1), (2)(a)-(h).
In addition to the jurisdictional basis for regulation set out in section 402, all states have
universal jurisdiction, without limitation, to regulate certain types of conduct, such as piracy,
slave trade, genocide, certain acts of terrorism, and war crimes. See id. § 404. These areas of
universal jurisdiction have developed as a matter of customary law and additional acts subject
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limitation imposed on the exception further restricts the scope of article
XX(b)'s exception. Most importantly, this jurisdictional limitation con-
strains a contracting party from unilaterally protecting the at-risk re-
sources of the global commons, such as the ozone, ocean water quality,
and at-risk species inhabiting common areas such as the high seas.56
ii. Article XX(g): Conservation of Exhaustible Natural
Resources
Article XX(g) provides an exception to GATT obligation for meas-
ures "relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such
measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic
production or consumption."57 The GATT dispute panel in its report on
"Canada-Measures Affecting Exports of Unprocessed Herring and
Salmon" stated that any trade measure taken under article XX(g) must
be "primarily aimed at" conserving the resource.58 Under this standard,
trade measures aimed at preserving a resource need not be necessary to
preserve the resource, but instead need only to be: 1) primarily aimed at
preserving the resource; 2) taken in conjunction with domestic restric-
tions on the use of the resource; and 3) primarily aimed at rendering the
domestic restriction effective. 59
As with article XX(b), prior to the Tuna/Dolphin Panel Report,
to universal jurisdiction (including protection of the environment) can be added in similar
fashion. Id. § 404 cmt. a.
As applied, these principles give a state the jurisdiction to prescribe laws with respect to
the conduct of foreign branches of domestic corporations and in limited circumstances, the
extraterritorial acts of affiliated foreign entities. This is the case where the regulation is essen-
tial to further major national interests of the regulating state, or where the national program of
which the regulation is a part can only be successful if it is applied to foreign subsidiaries. Id.
§ 414. The United States also recognizes the jurisdiction of a state to regulate anti-competitive
agreements or conduct occurring outside the territory of a state if the intent of the agreement
or conduct is to affect commerce and some effect results, or where the conduct has a substan-
tial effect on the commerce of a state and the exercise of jurisdiction is not unreasonable. Id
§ 415.
In the sphere of the environment, states are obligated to take measures to ensure that acts
within their jurisdiction or control conform with accepted international standards and norms,
and are conducted so as not to cause significant injury to the environment of another state or
beyond the limits of national jurisdiction. Id. § 601. The obligations imposed on states by
section 601 implies, at least indirectly, that states have the jurisdiction to prescribe laws to
meet these obligations.
56. See WWF, supra note 11, at 29.
57. See GATT, supra note 7, art. XXI(g), 61 Stat. at A61.
58. Canada - Measures Affecting Exports of Unprocessed Herring and Salmon, Report of
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many viewed article XX(g) as a mechanism for allowing contracting par-
ties environmental protection actions that would otherwise be in conflict
with their obligations under other provisions of the GATT. The Tuna/
Dolphin Panel Report, however, interpreted the scope of article XX(g)
much more narrowly, finding that article XX(g), like article XX(b), does
not apply to measures extending beyond a party's jurisdiction.' Addi-
tionally, the Panel narrowed the scope of article XX(g) by reading article
XX(g)'s "primarily aimed at" test to require many of the more stringent
requirements that the Panel applied under article XX(b)'s "necessary"
test. By merging to a certain extent article XX(g)'s "primarily aimed at"
requirements with article XX(b)'s stricter "necessity" requirements, the
tuna dolphin panel diminished the ability of the contracting parties to use
article XX(g) to harmonize environmental restrictions with their GATT
obligations.61
iii. Article XX(h): Intergovernmental Commodity Agreements
Article XX(h) provides an exception to GATT liability for the ac-
tions of the contracting parties taken pursuant to obligations incurred
under any international commodity agreement. 62 Article XX(h) may
provide a precedential model for the creation of a similar exception for
actions taken to accomplish obligations incurred under international en-
vironmental agreements. Because article XX(h) only allows actions
taken in accordance with international agreements, the creation of an
environmental XX(h) would not allow the contracting parties to act
unilaterally.
h. Article XXII and Article XXIII. Dispute Resolution Procedures
Articles XXII and XXIII provide the basis for the GATT's dispute
resolution procedures. Article XXII allows the parties in dispute to con-
sult informally without needing to invoke a formal GATT proceeding.63
Article XXHI sets forth two alternative methods for the formal resolu-
tion of GATT disagreements: subsection (1) provides for a process of
exchanging written representations, while subsection (2) provides for a
60. As with the Tuna/Dolphin Panel's decision on article XX(l)(b), it is, however, un-
clear from the decision whether this limits the exception to domestic actions to protect domes-
tic resources, or whether an extraterritorial action taken to protect a domestic resource is still
allowed under article XX(1)(g).
61. See Frictions Between International Trade Agreements and Environmental Protec-
tions, supra note 20, at 7 (discussing interplay of "primarily aimed at" and "necessary"
standards).
62. See GATT, supra note 7, art. XX(l)(h), 61 Stat. at A61.
63. See id art. XXII, 61 Stat. at A64.
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process of submission to the contracting parties to establish a dispute
panel. 64
While these dispute resolution mechanisms have been enhanced by
the Tokyo Round's Understanding Regarding Notification, Consulta-
tion, Dispute Settlement and Surveillance, 65 both the formal and infor-
mal dispute resolution mechanisms contained in articles XXII and
XXIII are quite opaque, precluding affected interests from overseeing the
dispute resolution process.66 This is of considerable concern to environ-
mentalists, who traditionally have sought standing to challenge environ-
mentally-related government actions in domestic courts and otherwise to
participate in the shaping of environmental policies.
i. Article XXIV" State and Local Laws
Article XXIV: 12 mandates that each contracting party take "all
reasonable measures" to ensure that the obligations provided in the
GATT are complied with at sub-national levels, including the actions of
regional, state, and local governments. 67 The "reasonable measures" test
has been interpreted to require that a contracting party must take all
available measures except those that are outside its "jurisdiction under
the constitutional distribution of power," to bring the sub-national regu-
lations into compliance with the contracting party's GATT obligations.
68
A great number of environmental laws and regulations, especially
within the United States, exist at the sub-national level. Local, state, and
regional environmental laws and regulations that do not comply with the
GATT cause a contracting party to violate its GATT obligations. 69 In
the United States, such a conflict raises constitutional questions; federal
attempts to enforce GATT obligations that trespass on local or state en-
vironmental regulations could be challenged on the grounds that they
exceed the constitutional limits of federal power. While the recent artic-
ulation of the "reasonable measures" test appears to avoid the potential
64. Id. art. XXIII, 61 Stat. at A64.
65. The Tokyo Round is discussed in section III.3.d. infra.
66. See WWF, supra note 11, at 19.
67. See GATT, supra note 7, art. XXIV(6), 61 Stat. at A67-68.
68. See GATr, United States--Measures Affecting Alcoholic and Malt Beverages, Report
of the Panel 97 (Feb. 7, 1992).
69. Before the recent GATT panel decision upholding Canada's challenge of U.S. state
laws that place non-tariff barriers to imports of Canadian beer, it was clear that GATT im.
posed obligations at the sub-federal level, although the extent of these obligations was not
clear. See Clyde H. Farnsworth, U.S.-Canada Rifts Grow Over Trade, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18,
1992, at Al; Territory v. Ho, 41 Haw. 565 (1957) (GATT applicable to state law); Hudec,
supra note 7, at 219-25; JACKSON, supra note 9, at 68 (discussing GATr's obligations at the
sub-national level).
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for constitutional conflict, it does establish a very broad scope for the
terms "all reasonable measures." For example, the federal government
can make aid money normally provided to the states contingent upon the
states adopting certain policies.7" Presumably, if a state or local environ-
mental measure violated the GATT obligations of the U.S. to meet the
"reasonable measures" test, the federal government would have to at-
tempt measures including, but not limited to, conditioning aid to the sub-
federal government entity's compliance with GAIT. The heightened
burden imposed on federal contracting parties to bring their sub-federal
environmental measures into line with the contracting party's GAT ob-
ligations could not only jeopardize existing sub-federal environmental
laws but also could have a significant chilling effect, preventing the enact-
ment of important new protections."1
j. Article XX" Waiver of Obligations
Under article XXV, a contracting party's specific GAIT obligations
may be waived by a two-thirds majority of the votes cast.72 Article
XXV's waiver provision potentially could be a means for ensuring the
GAIT-compatibility of some, if not all, of the existing international
agreements on the protection of the environment. 3 The "prevailing
view," however, is that article XXV waivers do not substitute for revising
the GATr's rules when necessary.74 Thus, waivers for existing environ-
mental agreements are "not a ready way around GAIT obligations."7 5
Even if an article XXV waiver did function as a ready way of bring-
ing the GATT and existing environmental agreements into accord and
thereby reconciling trade and the environment, a number of serious is-
sues concerning the impact of such a waiver on environmental protec-
tions must be addressed. For example if such a waiver is viewed as a
"one shot deal," waiving existing agreements could hamper the creation
of effective and enforceable environmental agreements in the future.
Moreover, the waiver of the GATT's obligations as to these treaties im-
plies that environmental rules are somehow subservient to those of inter-
national trade-a conclusion that the discussion of conflict of treaties
rules in section IV.A.B of this article shows may be inappropriate.
70. The federal government used such a funding device to encourage the states to raise
their drinking ages to twenty-one years of age.
71. See accordingly Letter from James E. Doyle, Attorney General of Wisconsin, to the
Honorable Stanley Gruzynski, State Representative 3-5 (Oct. 3, 1991) (on file with author).
72. See GATT, supra note 7, art. XXV.
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3. Tokyo Instruments and Their Impact on Environmental
Agreements and Concerns
a. The Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade: The Standards
Code
The Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade,7 6 commonly known
as the "Standards Code," is intended to ensure that the testing and adop-
tion of technical regulations or standards relating to health, safety, con-
sumer and -environmental protection, and other police power type
purposes do not create unnecessary barriers to trade. In accordance with
GATT article X's transparency mandates, the Standards Code requires
contracting parties to notify other parties of such standards and regula-
tions where they differ from international standards or are adopted in the
absence of any international standard and are expected to have an impact
on trade."' After notification, the other parties may comment on the
measures.
Signatories confronted with a challenge to a regulation may choose
between justifying the regulation under GATT or under the code. There
has never been a formal dispute resolution under the Standards Code.
Consequently it is difficult to determine how the Code's procedures and
substantive terms would apply, although the United States did use the
threat of a Standards Code challenge to cause the European Community
to soften its import ban on beef produced with hormones.
Nevertheless, the Standards Code generally follows article XX and
thus incorporates many of the same difficulties now being faced by envi-
ronmental regulations seeking to come within article XX. For instance,
despite the fact that contracting parties may invoke the Code's dispute
resolution mechanisms to examine PPMs, the Code is silent as to
whether trade restrictions based on PPMs fall within it.
While the Standards Code generally follows GATT's article XX, the
environmental scope of the Code allowances are arguably broader than
those of GATT article XX's exceptions. The Code explicitly mentions
the environment; thus environmental regulations that might fall outside
article XX's purview may come within the Code's allowances. For ex-
ample, if it is determined that the Standards Code regulates PPMs, the
76. GATr Doc. L/4907, BISD (26th Supp.) 8 (1980).
77. Between 1980 and 1990, 211 notifications took place in which the acting party stated
the objective of the standard was protection of the environment. GATT Secretariat Report on
Trade and the Environment, supra note 1, at 23. 167 other notifications have been justified
under similar grounds such as the protection of health, safety, and consumer protection. Id.
78. See Werner P. Meng, The Hormone Conflict Between the EEC and the United States
Within the Context of GATT, I1 MICH. J. INT'L L. 819, 824-27, 835-39 (1990).
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Code's broader environmental scope might allow for a wider range of
environmental PPM regulations.
b. The Agreement on Interpretation and Application of Articles
Vf, XVI and XXIII of the GAT. The Subsidies Code
The Agreement on Interpretation and Application of articles VI,
XVI, and XXIII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 9 or
the "Subsidies Code," substantively expands GATT article XVI's provi-
sions to encourage the parties more forcefully to eliminate subsidies as a
form of domestic trade regulation. The Subsidies Code requires signato-
ries to ensure that their use of subsidies does not harm the trading inter-
ests of other signatories and authorizes countervailing duties where
subsidized imports threaten material harm to domestic industries.8
Pursuant to the GATT, as expanded upon by the Subsidies Code, a
contracting party that subsidizes a domestic industry to reduce any addi-
tional costs its domestic industry must bear because of stricter environ-
mental standards will likely violate its GATT obligations."t If a
contracting party subsidizes its industries to mitigate internalized envi-
ronmental costs, the industries' exports could be subject to the imposi-
tion of countervailing duties by other contracting parties seeking to
eliminate the subsidy. The Canadian Government's subsidizing refores-
tation efforts and the development of sustainable forestry practices, for
example, might conflict with the Code."2
In addition to effectively precluding contracting parties from subsi-
dizing their industries for the costs of complying with higher environ-
mental standards (at least where the industries are export-oriented), the
Subsidies Code also makes it difficult for a contracting party to institute
countervailing measures under article VI to combat the subsidies result-
ing from lower environmental standards. 3
Although the language of article VI does not explicitly bar counter-
79. BISD (26th Supp.) 56 (1980).
80. See id
81. See GAIT, INDUSTRIAL POLLUTION CONTROL AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE,
(1971); Grimmett, supra note 10, at 16; JACKSON, supra note 9, at 209.
82. Five Year Development Agreement Reached, 14 Int'l Envtl. Rep. (BNA) 185, 207
(1991).
83. OECD, Joint Session, supra note 21, at 17. Three rationales are offered against coun-
tervailing measures for environmental standard subsidies: 1) the subsidy is put in place at the
production level and thus should be removed at the production level and not by measures at
the trade level that will only cause further distortions; 2) allowing countervailing measures for
environmental standards subsidies makes the continuation of a party's GATT "rights" contin-
gent on certain environmental behaviors and thus contradicts the unconditional nature of the
party's GATT "rights"; and 3) allowing a party to countervail for environmental standards
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vailing measures, the Subsidies Code limits a party's ability to impose
such countervailing measures."4 Pursuant to the Subsidies Code, to com-
mence a countervailing measure against a party subsidizing its domestic
industry, the challenging party must show that a subsidy exists which
causes harm to the industry of the challenging party. This provision has
two important implications for the use of countervailing duties and anti-
dumping rules to address differences in environmental protections be-
tween contracting parties.
First, whether a contracting party's failure to regulate adequately a
domestic industry is an implicit subsidy to that industry is not fully
answered.85
Second, a party seeking to prove an implicit environmental subsidy
or "eco-dumping" would have a difficult task establishing the necessary
elements to impose measures in compliance with the Code. 6 For a harm
to be considered an "injury," allowing the aggrieved party to institute a
counter-measure, the harm must fall within the the Subsidies Code's defi-
nition of "injury." It is unclear whether harm that stems from environ-
mental standards subsidies falls within the Subsidies Code's definition of
injury. For example, the Subsidies Code defines "injury" as relating to
certain types of economic harms felt by a specific industry of one con-
tracting party as a result of a subsidy provided by another contracting
party to its domestic industry. This definition fails to take into account
the many non-economic and attenuated economic harms which environ-
mental standard subsidies may inflict on populations outside of the in-
dustrial realm.
Moreover, the GATT Secretariat has indicated that for a con-
tracting party to prevail on a claim that another party's lower environ-
mental standards are a subsidy to its industries, the challenging party
would have to prove not only that the environmental standards were low,
causing a cognizable injury to the challenging party's industries, but that
the standards were too low given the other party's per capita income and
subsidies allows that party to unilaterally determine the appropriate level of environmental
protections for another party. Id.
84. See GATT Secretariat, Trade and the Environment, supra note 1, at 19.
85. See Piritta Sorsa, Environment-A New Challenge to GATT? 28 (June 1991) (manu.
script prepared for the 1992 World Development Report) [hereinafter Sorsa, Environment-A
New Challenge to GATT?]; see also Kenneth S. Komoroski, The Failure of Governments to
Regulate Industry: A Subsidy Under GA TT, 10 Hous. J. INT'L L. 189, 209 (1988).
86. See Sorsa, Environment-A New Challenge to GATT?, supra note 85, at 28; see also
infra section II.B.2.c. (discussing the U.S.'s proposed S.984, known as the International Pollu.
tion Deterrence Act (1991)).
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its environment's physical characteristics." This balancing test fails to
conform with the GATT's usual method of finding a subsidy, which does
not look to mitigating factors. Additionally, the Secretariat's balancing
formula for environmental subsidies is slanted towards allowing develop-
ing nations to maintain even lower environmental standards. This bias
fails to comport with the Uruguay Round's efforts to eliminate prefer-
ences to developing countries."8
c. The Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures
The Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures 9 seeks to ensure
that contracting parties do not use import licensing and registration
schemes to erect protectionist barriers to free trade. The Agreement es-
tablishes requirements that parties must follow in their national proce-
dures for submitting, reviewing, and granting importation licenses for
products entering their markets. The Agreement also limits the penalties
that may be administered for violations (including omissions and mis-
statements) of such national licensing requirements.
A number of national and international environmental protections
that attach to import licenses, such as the United States' Resources Con-
servation and Recovery Act,9' arise from stringent information and doc-
umentation regimes that must be followed strictly to avoid substantial
penalties. There have been no challenges to such programs under the
Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures that would shed light on
applying the Agreement in an environmental context.
d. The Understanding Regarding Notification, Consultation,
Dispute Settlement, and Surveillance
One of the GATT's most important goals is to provide a forum for
peacefully resolving trade conflicts. The Understanding Regarding Noti-
fication, Consultation, Dispute Settlement, and Surveillance 1 establishes
the procedural framework for handling disputes between contracting
parties arising under the terms of the GATT. Because these procedures
place a priority on easing the political difficulties that can arise in a mul-
87. See GATT Secretariat, Trade and the Environment, supra note 1, at 19.
88. See supra section II.4.g.
89. GATT Doc. BISD (26th Supp.) 154 (1980) (open for signature Apr. 12, 1979).
90. See 40 C.F.R. § 262.20 (1990) (imports of hazardous waste). The Department of
Transportation licensing schemes for the transportation of wastes in the United States work in
conjunction with the Environmental Protection Agency's regulations under RCRA and are
equally applicable. See 49 C.F.R. §§ 171-179 (1990).
91. GATT Doc. L/4907, BISD (26th Supp.) 210-18 (1980) (adopted on Nov. 18, 1979).
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tinational dispute, they include a number of provisions geared towards
allowing the parties to negotiate freely, unbridled by the spotlight of pub-
lic attention and oversight.
Because the Understanding cloaks its dispute resolution procedures,
its process contrasts sharply with the American system of citizen access
to information and public participation and oversight. Areas of friction
between these two systems arise from: 1) the closed nature of the GATT
dispute resolution process, including its exclusion of interested citizens
and non-governmental organizations from presenting information to
GATT dispute panels; 2) the embargo of papers submitted by the parties
to GATT panels; and 3) the embargo of panel decisions for a period of
time to allow for negotiations to take place.
Moreover, decisions resulting from the dispute resolution processes
are based solely on the terms of the GATT. Therefore, the dispute reso-
lution process and the ensuing decisions suffer from the environmental
limitations embodied within the GATT as a whole. 2
4. Instruments Under Negotiation in the Uruguay Round and
Their Impact on Environmental Agreements and
Concerns
Now in its fifth year, the Uruguay Round of the GATT has been
called the "most ambitious effort ever to reorganize the world's trading
system."93 The ambitious goals of the Round have jeopardized its ability
to come to an agreement, leading some to characterize the GATT as the
"General Agreement to Talk and Talk."94
The underlying intent of the Uruguay Round is to liberalize trade by
removing the remaining barriers to free and fair trade. There is no link
between liberalization per se and either environmental degradation or en-
vironmental preservation and remediation. Rather, the processes and
mechanisms by which trade is liberalized implicate the environment.
The one hundred and five parties (GATT's one hundred and two will be
joined by three developing nations) participating in the Uruguay Round
are discussing fifteen primary negotiating goals, of which at least ten im-
plicate the environment. The latest expression of the Uruguay Round's
progress towards an agreement among the parties is the GATT Secreta-
92. See Konrad von Moltke, International Trade and Environmental Imperatives: Dis-
pute Resolution and Transparency 2 (Jan. 20, 1992) (unpublished manuscript on file with
author).
93. GA 27 Bargaining Goes Down to the Wire, WALL ST. J. Mar. 6, 1992, at A6.
94. Id.
95. See generally Lori Wallach, The Dec. 20, 1991 Uruguay Round "Final Act" Text Is
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riat's Draft Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of




The tariff reductions being negotiated in the Uruguay Round apply
exclusively to imports. During the course of these negotiations, emphasis
also has been placed on "tariffication," the replacement of quotas in the
agricultural sector with tariffs."
Reducing tariffs effectively decreases the price of commodities and
products in the importing nation. In certain instances, tariff reductions
could cause the cost of products at market to reflect their true costs more
accurately, including their environmental and natural resource costs, re-
ducing the competitiveness of environmentally unsound products and in-
creasing consumer-based environmental protections.9" However, price
reductions that cause the cost of the imported product to fall below that
of competing products, can cause an increase in demand for the resource,
increasing, in turn, incentives to exploit the resource in an unsustainable
fashion.9 9 This is perhaps best exemplified by the reductions in tropical
timber tariffs currently being negotiated: if the tariffs on unprocessed
logs are abolished (as appears probable) then the demand for these goods
in timber-consuming nations could create increased pressure to over-util-
ize already dwindling areas of remaining tropical forests."00
Reducing tariffs, however, also could increase access for products
from developed countries to the markets of developing countries, thereby
potentially alleviating some of the development pressure on developing
countries' natural resources. 10 1 Additionally, tariff reductions that elimi-
nate escalating tariff schemes-schemes that place higher tariffs on value-
added products--could encourage developing countries to shift produc-
tion from unfinished raw goods (such as uncut logs) to value-added prod-
Worse Than Expected on Environmental, Health and Consumer Issues (Dec. 26, 1991) (mem-
orandum to Environmental, Health and Consumer Advocates, on file with Public Citizen).
96. GATT Secretariat, Draft Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of
Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Dec. 20, 1991, at C.1, L.2-11, 23, MTN/TNC/W/FA (1991)
[hereinafter Draft Final Act]; see also Keith Bradsher, Trade Plan Criticized, Stalling World
Talks, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 24, 1991, at D2.
97. Draft Final Act, supra note 96, at C.1, L.2-11, 23; see also Bradsher, supra note 96, at
D2.
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ucts (such as tables and chairs) that require less natural resources to
provide the same amount of economic value."12
b. Reduction of Agricultural Subsidies
One of the top priorities of the United States and certain other de-
veloped countries in the Uruguay Round is to reduce agricultural price
supports, export subsidies, and border controls.10 3 Agricultural subsi-
dies, like all other forms of subsidies, create trade distortions that lead to
inefficient use of resources.
In developed countries, specific area agricultural subsidies have been
a major factor in their specialization of agricultural activities. Specializa-
tion has caused distortions in the natural development of agricultural
markets because of preferences to development within those subsidized
sectors that have caused environmental harms." Thus, assuming that
unanticipated negative environmental results do not outweigh antici-
pated benefits, eliminating agricultural subsidies in developed nations
should have a positive environmental effect.
In developing nations, the effects of agricultural subsidies cuts are
more uncertain and will vary to a large extent from country to country,
depending on the manner in which each nation removes such subsidies.
Generally speaking, however, environmentalists have expressed fears
that if demand remains constant, eliminating agricultural subsidies will
increase prices and give farmers added incentive to till greater amounts
of marginal lands. 05
The overall environmental balance of eliminating agricultural subsi-
dies will be decided to a large extent by the treatment the Round affords
102. Id.
103. Draft Final Act, supra note 96, at L.2-11, 31-34. While the United States and other
developed countries are seeking reductions in agricultural subsidies, the split among the na-
tions of the European Community with regard to such reductions has been one of the major
sticking points in the Round. See GA T' Bargaining Does Down to the Wire, supra note 93;
Bradsher, supra note 96, at D2.
104. See GATT Secretariat, Trade and the Environment, supra note 1, at 32-33. Tradi-
tional commodity support programs:
encourage monocultural, chemical-intensive cropping of... a handfull of... 'pro-
gram' commodities. These rules penalize beneficial, multi-year crop rotations that
provide natural sources of fertilizer and biological means of pe.t control. With lim-
ited exceptions, subsidized crop insurance and credit program,; impose no environ-
mental conditions, and often make heavy agrichemical use a pre-condition of
assistance.
CENTER FOR RESOURCE EcONOMICS ET AL, FARM BILL 1990, at 8 (1991). The environmen-
tal effects of these farming practices include increased soil erosion, poisoning of water tables
and waterways, and the increased use of marginal lands. Id. at 8-15.
105. See WWF, supra note 11, at 27.
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to domestic agricultural support measures taken to reduce the degrading
effects of current agricultural production methods." Examples of such
support measures include the United States' conservation reserve pro-
gram, which provides subsidies to retire vast amounts of farmland as a
soil conservation measure,"°7 and the European Community's Common
Agricultural Policy provisions granting subsidies to set aside environ-
mentally sensitive farmlands.0'8 Many Uruguay Round participants
have expressed the view that such measures, provided they meet certain
criteria, should be excluded from the agricultural subsidies the Round is
considering eliminating.1 9 In this vein, the Draft Uruguay Round Deci-
sion on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures now under negotiation
draws a parallel to article XX's exceptions and establishes guidelines to
ensure that contracting parties' sanitary and phytosanitary measures are
both necessary for the protection of human, animal, or plant life and are
not arbitrary or unjustified barriers to trade.110
c. Liberalized Trade in Natural Resource Products
Another major goal of the developed nations in the Uruguay Round
is to remove trade barriers to the free flow of natural resources and natu-
ral resource-derived products. Ongoing negotiations in the natural re-
source-derived products group have focused on liberalized trade in
fisheries, forestry, minerals, and non-ferrous metals."' The developed
nations in this group have aimed their efforts at eliminating developing
countries' domestic export controls. Meanwhile, the developing nations'
agenda in this group has focused on increasing access for their products
in the markets of the developed countries.'
1 2
106. Id. at 28.
107. See Food Security Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-198, § 1231, 99 Stat. 1354, 1509
(1985). Subject to certain limited exceptions, the conservation reserve program prohibits the
production of commodities on highly erodible lands and pays farmers for setting aside these
lands for a ten year period. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 3811-36 (Supp. 1991). The conservation reserve
program currently protects more than 34 million acres of the United States' most fragile lands.
See CENTER FOR RESOURCE ECONOMICS ET AL, supra note 104, at 14.
108. See 1985 OJ. (L 93) 1, as amended 1990 0. (L 353) 12; 1991 OJ. (C 104) 1 (pro-
posed amble land set asides); see also D. BALDLOCK & D. CONDOR, RE.MOVING LAND FROM
AGRICULTURE: THE IMPLICATIONS FOR FARMING AND THE ENVIRONMENT (1987).
109. GATT The Uruguay Round and the Environment, GATT Focus, OcL 1991, at 3, 5
[hereinafter Uruguay Round and the Environment].
110. See Draft Final Act, supra note 96, at L.36-7; GATT Secretariat, Trade and Eniron-
ment, Factual Note by the Secretariat 14-15 GATT Doe. L/6896 (Aug. 1991) [hereinafter
Factual Note].
111. See Ministerial Declaration, GATT Doc. L/5424, BISD (29th Supp.) 9, 20-21 (1983)
(adopted Nov. 29, 1982); WWF, supra note 11, at 26.
112. See WWF, supra note 11, at 26.
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If this group is successful in forging an agreement that removes ex-
port controls and/or increases market access for developing nations' nat-
ural resource-derived products, it is possible that demand for these




Yet another goal of the Uruguay Round is the curtailing of non-
tariff, or technical, barriers to trade.1 14 Increased emphasis on removing
technical barriers to trade, including labeling requirements, could ad-
versely affect the ability of the contracting parties to adopt environmental
or conservation-oriented policies and laws. Under -the rules now being
discussed in the Uruguay Round, where international technical stan-
dards exist, parties are obligated to adopt these standards subject to cer-
tain narrow exceptions. 1 5 Even where no international standard exists,
the rules now proposed in the Uruguay Round would require that all
technical standards be "not-more trade restrictive than necessary." ' 6
This "not-more restrictive than necessary" requirement would limit the
ability of the parties to adopt appropriate environmental policies
substantially." 7
The agreement now being negotiated further would require federal
governments to take affirmative action to bring standards adopted at the
sub-federal level into compliance with the GATT." 8 By exposing the
contracting party to countervailing measures for the sub-federal GATT
violation, this proposed rule could severely limit the ability of states and
municipal governments to regulate local environmental concerns. More-
over, the Uruguay Round's proposed rules on technical barriers would
also require the parties to take steps to ensure that non-governmental
organizations, such as those that certify products with a "green seal of
approval," also function in conformity to the rules against technical bar-
riers that the parties adopt.119 The proposed rules also would subject
technical barriers to full GATT enforcement mechanisms, including
countervailing duties and dispute resolution procedures. 120
113. Id.
114. See Draft Final Act, supra note 96, at G.1-27; Factual Note, supra note 110, at 10-11.
115. See Draft Final Act, supra note 96, at G. 1-5.
116. Id. at G.2.2.
117. See Steve Charnovitz, Trade Negotiations and the Environment, 15 Int'L. Envt. Rep.
(BNA) 144, 145 (1992) [hereinafter Trade Negotiations].
118. Draft Final Act, supra note 96, at G.5.
119. Id. at G.5.
120. Id. at G.18.
[V/ol. 15
Trade, Environment, & Sustainable Development
e. Trade in Tropical Products
Beyond the Uruguay Round's general attention to eliminating barri-
ers to trade in natural resource-derived products and to agricultural sub-
sidies, the participants are negotiating similar proposals in the specific
context of tropical products and resources. 12 ' The negotiations on tropi-
cal products, focusing mainly on plant-derived foods, but also including
tropical timber, tobacco, and natural rubber, seek to reduce tariffs on
these products and eliminate non-tariff barriers to their trade."~
As discussed above,123 the expected environmental effects of tariff
reductions are somewhat mixed. These reductions ultimately may pro-
duce benefits to the environment. The environmental effects of tariff re-
ductions, however, may not be as benign in tropical regions where many
of the food products--coffee and coconut palms, for example-that
could experience demand-driven production intensification are grown on
cleared forest lands.'24
f. Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
The negotiation of Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights
(TRIPS) has been one of the more contentious areas under consideration
in the Uruguay Round. 2 Developed countries, recognizing the trade
distorting effects resulting from the lack of effective intellectual property
protections, are looking to the TRIPS negotiations to provide interna-
tional protections against widespread "pirating" of intellectual property
from these countries' research organizations and industries.' 26 Develop-
ing nations, many of which continue to lack effective domestic intellec-
tual property protection mechanisms, have sought to trade concessions
on a TRIPS agreement for greater access to developed nations' markets
for their TRIPS products, as well as for concessions in other areas of the
Round. 27 Additionally, some developing countries have argued that the
need to stimulate domestic development justifies lower levels of intellec-
tual property rights protection in developing countries and have sought
to distinguish intellectual property rights and trade issues.'
28
121. See WWF, supra note 11, at 28.
122. Id
123. See supra section H.4.a.
124. WWF, supra note 11, at 28.
125. Draft Final Act, supra note 96, at 57-90; see also Frank Emmert, Intellectual Prperty
in the Uruguay Round Negotiating Strategies of the Western Industrialized Countries, I 1 MiCH.
J. INT'L L. 1317, 1319-21, 1354-56, 1372 (1990).
126. Draft Final Act, supra note 96, at 57-90.
127. See WWF, supra note 11, at 29-30.
128. See Emmert, supra note 125, at 1354-56.
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The TRIPS agreement could have two significant environmental
ramifications. First, certain environmental organizations fear that
stronger intellectual property protections will hamper the transfer of en-
vironmentally-sound technologies to developing countries, especially in
light of the transfer goals of the Montreal Protocol and the global warm-
ing agreement currently being negotiated.29 It is likely, however, that
such protections would actually assist the development and transfer of
such technologies, although developing countries may find themselves in
need of financial assistance to pay for the costs of such technologies. In
general, evolving environmentally-friendly technologies are owned by
private entities. Unless these technologies are secure from "piracy," the
private parties investing in their development will be reluctant to supply
these technologies to much of the developing world.
Second, industries in developed countries are increasingly turning to
biodiverse ecosystems, such as tropical rain forests, as resource ware-
houses and to the indigenous peoples who live in these ecosystems for
their knowledge about the resources these ecosystems hold.130 Whether
or not the contributions of indigenous discoverers, preservers, and users,
and national governments that preserve these ecosystems, will receive
some form of intellectual property recognition to give economic value to
their efforts is at issue in the Uruguay Round's negotiations.' A trade
agreement providing tangible benefits to these indigenous peoples and na-
tional governments would encourage the preservation of these ecosys-
tems and indigenous cultures, whereas the failure of the Round to come
to such an agreement could frustrate ongoing conservation and preserva-
tion efforts substantially.'32
Under the current Dunkel draft text, life forms, including plants and
animals, may be patented; however, countries may elect to limit patent
protection to only microorganisms.1 33 Countries can also elect to ex-
clude inventions from intellectual property protections for reasons of mo-
rality or of endangering human, animal, or plant life or health.134 By
not requiring intellectual property protections for biotechnology discov-
129. See WWF, supra note 11, at 30 (discussing the view that intellectual property protec-
tions could hinder environmental technology transfer). Additionally, it is difficult to deter-
mine how many of the environmental technologies that must be transferred to assist countries
in developing sustainably are protected by intellectual property regimes.
130. See Robert Weissman, Prelude to a New Colonialism, THE NATION, Mar. 18, 1991, at
336, 336-38.
131. See Factual Note, supra note 110, at 17; Weissman, supra note 130, at 336-38.
132. See Weissman, supra note 130; WWF, supra note 11, at 29.
133. See Draft Final Act, supra note 96, at Y, Annex III.
134. Id. at 69.
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eries, the Dunkel draft fails to ensure the protection of the contributions
of indigenous peoples. Similarly, the Dunkel draft leaves a substantial
loophole for countries to continue to "pirate" technologies by allowing
for the denial of intellectual property protections for moral, life, health,
safety, and conservation goals. While this loophole may allow develop-
ing countries to obtain existing environmentally friendly technologies less
expensively, it does little to ensure the international availability of these
technologies and stifles the competitive impetus for companies to invest
in developing new technologies that may be environmentally beneficial.
g. The "'Development Policy"
Throughout its history, the GATT has accorded developing nations
special privileges to accommodate their development needs. This com-
mitment, called the "Development Policy," permits developing nations
to use trade restrictions, including import curbs and export limits, that
are unavailable to other contracting parties.13 5 Developed countries are
using the Uruguay Round to encourage developing countries to relin-
quish many, if not all, of these special privileges.
13 6
While reducing the barriers to trade can have certain environmental
benefits,' 3 ' if the Development Policy is rescinded, the inability of these
nations to provide protections to fledgling industries could cause these
industries to adopt practices aimed at short-term survival as opposed to
long-term sustainability 1 3 1 The ultimate environmental effect of this
proposal is difficult to discern at this time.
h. Subsidies and Countervailing Measures
In an effort to provide greater clarity and to reduce international
trade conflicts, early negotiations in the Uruguay Round attempted to
classify a range of subsidies into three general categories: permissive sub-
sidies, "proceed at the risk of domestic countervailing duty proceedings"
subsidies, and prohibited subsidies.1 39 Subsidies for environmental pur-
poses were placed in the permissive, or "no-action" category-the so
called "green box.""
Acquiescing to the United States' demands to eliminate what the
135. See WWF, supra note 11, at 29. The Development Policy appears in the balance or
payment provisions of GATT articles XII and XIII.
136. See Draft Final Act, supra note 96, at B.1, R.1-4.
137. See supra section II.A.4.a.
138. See WWF, supra note 11, at 29.
139. See Draft Final Act, supra note 96, at 1.1, 3, 5; Factual Note, supra note 110, at 16-17.
140. See Draft Final Act, supra note 96, at 92-94; see also WWF, supra note 11, at 29.
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U.S. perceived to be an overly permissive loophole for subsidies, the
Dunkel draft deletes the green box, rendering virtually all environmental
subsidies vulnerable to challenge. 141 Only subsidies for "clearly defined"
environmental and conservation programs that provide public payments
to agricultural producers would be classified as unactionable.
142
Approving the Dunkel draft's text on subsidies would impede the
ability of the contracting parties to assist their industries in becoming
more environmentally sustainable. The types of programs made vulnera-
ble by the draft's text include Canada's program of subsidizing the devel-
opment of sustainable forestry practices.
i. Harmonization of Environmental, Health, and Safety
Standards
One of the most environmentally important negotiations underway
in the Uruguay Round is the negotiation of harmonized health and envi-
ronmental standards.143 The Uruguay Round's negotiations on harmo-
nizing standards have been premised on three principles: 1) parties must
adopt strict principles of national treatment in standard-setting and en-
forcement; 2) parties' decisions to permit or restrict the availability of a
new product or technology may only be based upon "sound scientific
evidence;"" and 3) international agencies, such as Codex Ali-
mentarius, 145 are the only legitimate sources of scientific information.146
Harmonization of standards could produce either more stringent or
141. See Trade Negotiations, supra note 117, at 146-47.
142. See Draft Final Act, supra note 96, at L, pt. A, Annex 2; see also Trade Negotiations,
supra note 117, at 147.
143. See Draft Final Act, supra note 96, at G.1-27; see generally Wallach, supra note 95.
144. Although sound science is an important part of setting appropriate environmental,
health, and safety standards, even with the most reliable scientific information, standard set-
ting still relies heavily upon extrapolation from existing data. Thus, sound science cannot
eliminate the need for policy decisions to be made based upon scientific evidence. Because
even with sound science countries must still make risk assessment and management decisions,
sound science is not a panacea for the conflicts between trade and environmental policies, See
Trade Negotiations, supra note 117, at 146.
145. Codex Alimentarius Commission is the primary international standard-setting body
dealing with food products. See Daphne Wysham, The Codex Connection: Big Business Hijacks
GA77, 251 THE NATION 770, 770-72 (1990); WWF, supra note 11, at 30-31. Codex's aim is
the development of harmonized regulations pertaining to animal, vegetable, and other food
products. Codex is administered by the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization
and is co-financed by the World Health Organization. See Wysham, supra. Membership within
the Codex Commission is made up of officials appointed by member-nation governments. Id.
For example, the United States delegation is headed up by a White House appointee from the
Department of Agriculture. Id. Codex delegations also, generally, include appointees drawn
from the respective regulated industry sectors. Id.
146. See Draft Final Act, supra note 96, at G.1-5.
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lenient standards.' 47 If existing levels of protection do not diminish in
the process, harmonizing environmental, health, and safety standards
could have significant environmental and trade benefits. By providing
unified standards, harmonization would diminish the burdens that the
plethora of sometimes widely divergent national standards have imposed
on internationally-traded products.' Moreover, harmonized standards
that raise the environmental, health, and safety standards of nations with
lower levels of existing protections would bring much needed protections
to many nations.
Additionally, whether or not industries actually migrate to nations
with lower environmental standards, 49 harmonized standards would re-
move the incentive for industries to do so. Developing nations, however,
fear that raising standards to the level of the developed world would im-
pede increased market access for their products and would deprive them
of the ability to choose increased levels of development as opposed to
higher levels of environmental quality. 1 0
In contrast, if harmonized standards are set at the level of the coun-
try with the lowest standard-the least common denominator ap-
proach-environmental protection in countries with higher standards
will suffer. 5' And the strict harmonization of standards could hamper
the evolution of environmental protections by removing the ability of in-
dividual contracting parties to push environmental standards forward. 52
The harmonization provisions of the Dunkel draft, with their strong
bias towards international standards (and consequently, against domestic
standards that are more stringent than international standards) appear to
147. Affidavit of Joan Claybrook at 29-30, Public Citizen v. Office of the United States
Trade Representative, 782 F. Supp. 139 (D.D.C. 1992) (No. 91-1916).
148. See U.S. COUNCIL FOR INTERNATIONAL BusINEss, AN INTEGRATED APPROACH TO
ENVIRONMENT AND TRADE ISSUES (statement presented to Carla A. Hills, U.S. Trade Repre-
sentative and William W. Reilly, Administrator, Environmental Protection Agency) 1, 6 (Mar.
27, 1991). Cf David Robertson, Trade and the Environment Harmonization and Technical
Standards, Oct. 10, 1991 (paper presented at the symposium on Int'l Trade & the Env't, spon-
sored by Int'l Trade Division, Int'l Economics Dep't, World Bank) (noting that harmonization
is not necessary for increased trade efficiencies and may not provide environmental benefits).
149. See generally Patrick Low & Alexander Yeats, Do Dirty Industries Migrate (Nov.
1991) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author); Robert Lucas, et al., Economic Develop-
ment, Environmental Regulation and International Migration of Toxic Industrial Pollution:
1960-1988 (Nov. 1991) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). See also infra note 189.
150. See Gene Grossman, In Poor Regions Environmental Law Should Be Appropriate,
N.Y. TImEs, Mar. 1, 1992, at Cll ("Attention to environmental issues is a luxury poor coun-
tries can't afford").
151. WWF, supra note 11, at 30-31; Frictions Between International Trade Agreements
and Environmental Protections, supra note 20, at 9.
152. See WWF, supra note 11, at 30.
1992]
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
adopt an approach that more closely resembles a lowest common denom-
inator approach. 153 This raises serious concern that iF the Dunkel draft is
accepted, the harmonizing that will occur under the draft's procedures
will compromise existing environmental protections. For example, the
United States' Delaney Clause'54 prohibits the use of any food additives
that have a cancer risk level greater than zero. The Delaney Clause's
zero risk factor is substantially more stringent than both international
standards and other United States cancer risk standards and could be
jeopardized by the proposed Uruguay Round provisions on
harmonization.
155
Another problem with the Dunkel draft is that its delegation of en-
vironmental, health, and safety standard-setting to international appoin-
tees rather than to democratically elected representatives could
undermine developing democratic processes in many nations. It also
conflicts with the traditional processes of public participation and ac-
countability in nations (including the United States) with established
democratic schemes of governance.' 56 Additionally, there are concerns
over procedural obstacles to effective peer review of these internationally
set standards, such as the lack of a "paper trail" of -the decision-making
process. For example, environmentalists note that the Canadian pesti-
cide standards, which were harmonized under the United States-Canada
Free Trade Agreement, would not have been so compromised if the pro-
cess of harmonization had gone through the democratic parliamentary
process.
157
j. Trade in Services
Article XIV in the draft Agreement on Trade in Services contains
exceptions to the general obligations set out in the agreement.'58 To a
large extent these exceptions parallel the public policy exceptions to
GATT's general obligations contained in GATT article XX.159 Certain
153. See Trade Negotiations, supra note 117, at 146.
154. 21 U.S.C. § 348(c).
155. See Trade Negotiations, supra note 117, at 146.
156. See WWF, supra note 11, at 30-31; Wysham, supra note 145, at 770-72. For example,
Codex panels are heavily lobbied by national constituencies that include disproportionate rep-
resentation from the industrial sectors the panels regulate. See id. Codex panel decisions are
not exposed to external peer review and do not provide a paper record that discloses the
"sound science" behind the decision so as to allow independent evaluation of the decision. See
id.
157. See Steven Shrybman, Trading Away the Environment, 9 WORLD POL'Y J. 93, 106
(1992).
158. See Draft Final Act, supra note 96, at 18, art. XIV, 103 Annex II.
159. See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
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countries have proposed that article XIV should not only allow the par-
ties to take measures necessary to protect human, animal, and plant life
and health but should also allow for measures which are necessary for
"sustainable development and environment," "cultural values," and
"conservation of exhaustible natural resources."'' These expanded defi-
nitions would allow a wider range of environmental measures to conform
with the GATT in the services area and would provide a precedent for
future efforts aimed at minimizing the frictions between trade and envi-
ronmental concerns. These expanded definitions are, however, not re-
flected in the Uruguay Round's proposed final agreement on trade in
services.161 Moreover, although the Dunkel Draft's services text includes
an exception for life and health that parallels the GATT's article XX(b)
exception, the Draft does not provide a conservation exception parallel-
ing the GATT's article XX(g).
k. Dispute Resolution
The dispute resolution rules being negotiated in the Uruguay Round
would change the existing GAT dispute resolution framework signifi-
cantly. First, under the proposed rules, unless a consensus of the parties
votes against adopting the report of a dispute resolution panel, all panel
reports are automatically adopted sixty days after publication. 6 This
change would reverse the current rule, which requires a consensus of the
parties to adopt the decision of a dispute resolution panel. By making
the adoption of panel reports virtually automatic, the proposed rule
would minimize the ability of the parties to block such an adoption,
thereby exacerbating the potential for direct conflicts between GAT ob-
ligations and environmental protections.
Second, the Uruguay Round dispute resolution proposal would ex-
pand the reach of the GAT's dispute resolution mechanisms, including
the application of countervailing sanctions and the availability of dispute
panels, to include sub-federal level trade restrictions explicitly.163 This
proposal would expose a host of sub-federal level environmental regula-
tions to potential GAIT challenges.
Third, the proposed dispute resolution rules strengthen the enforce-
ment of GAT obligations by: 1) increasing the burden on parties de-
fending against a GATT challenge by requiring them to rebut the
inference that a breach of a GAT obligation entails an injury to chal-
160. See Factual Note, supra note 110, at 18.
161. See Draft Final Act, supra note 96, at 18 art. XIV, 102 Annex II.
162. See 1d. at S.12.
163. See id at S.18.
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lenging parties;164 and 2) affirmatively charging parties that violate
GATT obligations with either complying with their GATT obligations
or facing trade sanctions. 165 Strengthening the GATT's enforcement
powers would exacerbate the already existing potential for direct conflict
between the GATT and environmental initiatives.
1. Multilateral Trading Organization
The final proposed text of the Uruguay Round would establish a
Multilateral Trading Organization (MTO).' 66 The proposed MTO
would adopt the GATT as it exists after the Tokyo and Uruguay Rounds
as its rules and would have in all territories of the member states the legal
capacity, privileges, and immunities as needed to carry out its functions
under these rules. 67 By expanding the obligations of all the GATT par-
ties to include the obligations contained in the Tokyo and Uruguay
Round agreements and understandings, creating an MTO as now pro-
posed would expand the powers and scope of GATT significantly, in-
creasing the GATT's ability to trump environmental regulations.
Additionally, the creation of an MTO might re-start the GATT's clock,
making the GATT later-in-time than most environmental laws and
agreements. 68 Finally, some scholars have noted that institutionalizing
GATT without mentioning the environment represents a waste of a sub-
stantial opportunity to bring about the overall greening of GAIT. 169
Proponents of the MTO regard it as too late in the negotiation of the
Uruguay Round to begin discussing the environment. A compromise
view that would make a "Green Round" of the GATT the first item on
the MTO's agenda currently is being discussed. 7 '
5. Other GATT Activities
a. The Working Group on the Export of Domestically Prohibited
Goods and Other Hazardous Substances
In 1982, the contracting parties agreed to examine measures to con-
164. See id. at S.3.
165. See id. at S.16.
166. See id. at 95.
167. See id. at 92, 95.
168. For a discussion of the effects of the "later in time rule" see supra section IV.A. Wile
the adoption of the MTO might make GATT later-in-time, it would not necessarily make
GATT more specific than these environmental laws and treaties. Under conflicts of laws and
conflicts of treaties analyses, if an earlier treaty or law is more specific than a later law or
treaty, then the earlier treaty is not trumped by the later treaty.
169. See Trade Negotiations, supra note 117, at 147-48.
170. Id.
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trol the export of products that are prohibited from sale in domestic mar-
kets yet are allowed to continue as exports. 171 This agreement evolved
into the GATT Council's creation of the Working Group on the Export
of Domestically Prohibited Goods and Other Hazardous Substances in
1989. This working group examines the trade-related aspects of ongoing
international work, such as the Basel Convention,1 2 to regulate the flow
of such goods and substances among the contracting parties.
1 73
The working group currently is considering a Draft Decision on
Products Banned or Severely Restricted in the Domestic Markets. 4
This draft covers all products (including hazardous wastes) that a con-
tracting party determines present a serious and direct danger to human,
animal, or plant life or health, or the environment within the contracting
party's territory, and which are banned or severely restricted within the
contracting party's domestic markets.'7 5 The draft also includes notice
provisions requiring the contracting parties to notify the GATT Secreta-
riat of all such banned or restricted products for which no similar control
of exports have occurred. 7 6  In an effort to avoid conflict and duplica-
tion, the draft does not apply to substances covered under other interna-
tional regimes (such as the Basel Convention) to which a contracting
party is a signatory.1
7 7
An agreement allowing the contracting parties to make efforts to
regulate trade in hazardous and otherwise restricted substances could
provide substantial environmental protections, as well as allowing inter-
national environmental agreements pertaining to similar matters greater
ability to conform with GATT's mandates. If the working group cannot
assist the contracting parties in forging such an understanding, however,
then domestic initiatives, such as the ban on exporting domestically pro-
hibited pesticides Congress considered in the 1990 farm bill, would ap-
pear to violate the GATT.
7 8
171. See Uruguay Round and the Environment, supra note 109, at 3.
172. See section m.A.3. infra.
173. BISD (36th Supp.) 402, 403 (1990).
174. See Uruguay Round and the Environment, supra note 109, at 4.
175. See Factual Note, supra note 110, at 9.
176. Id
177. Id
178. Grimmett, supra note 10, at 19. See also S. 2830, 101st Cong. 2d Sess. (1990); H.R.
3950, 102d Cong. 1st Sess. (1990). The provisions in both the House and Senate bills that
would have banned the export of domestically prohibited pesticides were dropped in
conference.
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b. The Group on Environmental Measures and International
Trade
The Group on Environmental Measures and International Trade
was established at the November 1971 GATT Council meeting. In the
ensuing twenty years, the group has been dormant. However, as a result
of pressure from European Free Trade Association member states and
other countries, the group has recently convened.1 79 The group's current
agenda is to consider: 1) trade provisions contained in existing multilat-
eral environmental agreements; 2) multilateral transparency of national
environmental laws and regulations that are likely to have effects on
trade; and 3) trade effects of newly developing domestic and international
"eco" packaging and labeling requirements. 180 Additionally, the group
is discussing a GATT contribution to the 1992 United Nations Confer-
ence on Environment and Development. 81 Believing that the GATT is
not the appropriate forum for such discussions, certain GATT parties,
most notably the developing nations, were against convening the
group. 182
Given the group's early emphasis on the impact of environmental
protection on trade, environmental groups have expressed fears that the
group will focus on subjugating environmental protections to trade's re-
gimes as opposed to finding some way of reconciling the concerns of both
trade and environmental interests. At this time, it is unclear to what
extent these fears are justified.
B. The Environmental Implications of the NAFTA. and the CFTA
Although the vast majority of trade occurs under the umbrella of
GATT, a wide range of additional regional and bilateral trade agree-
ments have a hand in determining patterns of national and international
resource use. With the emergence of rival trading blocs, including a
more integrated European Community and the possibility of an Associa-
tion of South East Asian Nations free trade area, bilateral and multilat-
eral trade agreements increasingly will play a major role in determining
the competitiveness of domestic industries in world markets.1 83 In the
179. See Factual Note, supra note 110, at 4-6; GAYT to Focus on Trade and Environment
Link, GATT Focus, Oct. 1991, at 1.
180. See GATT Secretariat, Trade and the Environment, supra note 1, at 10; GATT to
Focus on Trade and Environment Link, supra note 179, at 1.
181. GATT to Focus on Trade and Environment Link, supra note 179, at 1.
182. Id.
183. See Stuart Auerbach, Bush Stresses U.S. Commitment to Asia, WASH. POST, Jan. 5,
1992, at A23; ASEAN Endorses Free-Trade Area, WALL ST. J., Oct. 9, 1991, at A-12,
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context of resource consumption patterns in the Americas, the most im-
portant of these agreements are the United States/Canadian Free Trade
Agreement (CFTA) and the ongoing negotiation of a trilateral North
American free trade agreement among the United States, Canada, and
Mexico (NAFIA).
1. NAFTA
Joint efforts between President Bush and Mexico's President Salinas
to craft a Mexico/United States free trade agreement began in September
of 1990.'11 On February 5, 1991, after Canada expressed a desire to be
included in the Mexico/United States negotiations, the bilateral United
States/Mexico talks became the current trilateral NAFTA
negotiations.'8 5
The creation of a trilateral trade agreement between the United
States, Canada, and Mexico would form the world's largest market, inco-
porating 360 million consumers and a total output of $6 trillion.
8 6
NAFTA seeks to eliminate trade barriers and to reduce market distor-
tions and hence economic inefficiencies between the United States first-
and third-largest trading partners, enabling a free and fair trade block.'
Environmentalists have subjected NAFTA to intense scrutiny. Pro-
ponents of NAFTA argue that NAFTA and its negotiations will provide
Mexico with both the impetus and the resources to address its environ-
mental difficulties.' But its critics argue that absent significant changes
in Mexico's environmental practices, NAFTA will open the way for U.S.
industries to escape U.S. environmental requirements by moving their
184. See Arlene Wilson et. al, North American Free Trade Agreement: Ismues for Congress,
Mar. 25, 1991, at 1, Cong. Res. Service, No. 91-282-E (1991). Official dialogue between the
Bush and Salinas administrations concerning a potential MFTA commenced in June of 1990
with the issuance of a joint statement in support of negotiation of an MFTA. Id In a letter of
Aug. 21, 1990, President Salinas proposed that negotiations commence. Id In response to the
Mexican President's letter, President Bush notified the Senate Finance Committee and the
House Ways and Means Committee of the intent to enter into negotiations. Id at 1-2.
185. See Executive Office of the President, Response of the Administration to Issues Raised
in Connection with the Negotiation of a North American Free Trade Agreement, May 1, 1991,
at I [hereinafter May I Plan].
186. Id.
187. Id Taking Mexico as an example, in 1989 Mexico was the United States' third largest
trading partner with a turnover (exports plus imports) of approximately S52 billion. See Mex-
ico-U.S. Free Trade Agreement?, Jan. 7, 1991, at 5. In the same year, the United States was
Mexico's largest trading partner, accounting for 66% of all Mexican exports and 62% of all
imports. Id
188. See William K. Reilly, Mexico's Environment Will Improve With Free Trade, WALL
ST. J., Apr. 19, 1991, at A15 (Mr. Reilly is the administrator of the U.S. EPA); May 1 Plan,
supra note 185, at 1-3.
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operations to Mexico."8 9 They also argue that increasing economic activ-
ity in Mexico without proper environmental controls will only exacerbate
Mexico's environmental problems.19 Mexico's environmental problems
are already surfacing in the Southwestern region of the United States. 191
Additionally, they criticize the U.S. decision to deal with environmental
issues on a parallel track rather than as an integrated part of NAFTA. 192
Environmentalists point out that both the United States and Canada, for
the most part, have lived up to their obligations under the CFTA because
of the CFTA's trade enforcement provisions; in contrast, the United
States and Canada both have failed to live up to their obligations under
the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement because it lacks effective en-
forcement provisions."'
In an effort to reassure environmentalists from all three NAFTA
189. See Bruce Stokes, Greens Talk Trade, NAT'L J., Apr. 13, 1991, at 862, 864.66; CRS:
North American Free Trade Agreement: Issues for Congress, July 12, 1991, at 47-48. While
comprehensive data regarding the potential flight of U.S. businesses south of the border to
avoid more stringent U.S. environmental regulation is lacking, such pollution migration may
already be occurring. There have been reports that at least forty Southern California furniture
makers have relocated all or part of their operations to Mexico to avoid the Southern Califor-
nia Air Quality District's standards that require the use of low-emission paints, varnishes and
solvents. See Robert Reinhold, Mexico Proclaims an End to Sanctuary for Polluters, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 18, 1991, at A20; GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, U.S.-MExIco TRADE: SOME
U.S. WOOD FURNITURE FIRMS RELOCATED FROM Los ANGELES AREA TO MExico, Report
to the Chairman, Comm. on Energy and Commerce, House of Representatives, GAO/NSIAD-
91-191, 1-4 (Apr. 1991).
In addition to the environmental questions raised by the NAFTA, labor groups argue that
the NAFTA will cause a migration of American jobs to Mexico and will hurt U.S. industries
as Mexican industries become more competitive. See Gary Lee, Lobbyists Clash Over Free
Trade Accord, WASH. POST, Apr. 28, 1991, at A4, A6; Geroge W. Grayson Mexico's Pemex
Begins to Act Like a Competitor, WALL ST. J., Sept. 27, 1991, at A 1.
190. See Stokes, supra note 189, at 864-66.
191. See LESLIE KOCHAN, THE MAQUILADORAS AND ToxiCs: THE HIDDEN COSTS OF
PRODUCTION SOUTH OF THE BORDER 7 (1989). Issues Relating to a Bilateral Free Trade
Agreement with Mexico: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Western Hemisphere and Peace
Corps Affairs of the Senate Comm on Foreign Relations, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 117 (1991)
(Statement of Micheal McCloskey, Chairman, Sierra Club [hereinafter McCloskey]). The aqu-
ifers that supply water to communities on both sides of the U.S./Mexican border are being
seriously depleted and poisoned by the improper disposal of wastes, largely from the Mexican
maquiladora industries. Id. Liver and gall bladder cancer incidence rates from communities
that get their drinking water from the Rio Grande have been found to be significantly higher
than the U.S. national averages. KOCHAN, supra at 7. Santa Cruz County, Arizona was
forced, on at least one occasion, to declare a state of emergency after millions of gallons of raw
sewage from Mexico were released into its water treatment system. Mexico's Maqulladoras:
Free Trade, or Foul Play?, E: ENVIRONMENT MAGAZINE, July/Aug., 1991, at 36-37. The
hepatitis rate in Nogales, Arizona, a community downstream of certain Mexican maqui-
ladoras, has shot up to 20 percent over the national average. Id.
192. See Stokes, supra note 189, at 865.
193. Shrybman, supra note 157, at 107.
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participant countries, the United States Trade Representative, in con-
junction with other American and Mexican governmental agencies, has
released a comprehensive review of U.S-Mexican environmental issues
predicated upon the assumption that "increased economic activity is
likely to translate into greater environmental protection."' 194 Environ-
mentalists point out that economic growth in the U.S.-Mexican border
region, caused by the expansion of the maquiladora industry, has failed
to bring about environmental benefits and in fact has caused increased
environmental degradation."' To ensure that the environmental effects
of NAFTA are known and addressed, environmentalists have also com-
menced litigation to have an environmental impact statement prepared
for the NAFTA negotiations."9"
2. CFTA
The concerns over NAFTA have been heightened by problems aris-
ing from CFTA. Challenges to domestic environmental laws as non-
tariff trade barriers and harmonization by reducing environmental stan-
dards under CFTA have underscored the weaknesses of negotiating trade
agreements without regard to environmental issues.
The CFTA has functioned both as a sword to attack more stringent
domestic environmental regulation and as a shield to protect less strin-
gent environmental and health standards. For instance, both U.S. and
Canadian entities have used the CFTA and GATT prohibitions on non-
tariff trade barriers to challenge the other nation's domestic environmen-
tal laws. In the CFTA's first dispute resolution panel decision, the
panel found the provisions of the Canadian Fisheries Act, which required
that all fish caught for commercial purposes in Canadian waters must be
landed first in Canada for biological sampling, to violate the CFTA. 19
While the biological sampling requirement clearly restricted trade, the
requirement was intended to provide accurate and reliable data to ensure
adequate fisheries management over already-depleted stocks of herring
and salmon in Canada's Pacific coast waters. 198 The U.S. Non-Ferrous
194. Id
195. Id
196. See Public Citizen v. United States Trade Representative, 782 F. Supp. 139 (D.D.C.
1992), appeal docketed, No. 92-5010 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 14, 1992) (dismissing litigation requesting
an environmental impact statement for the NAFTA and Uruguay Round negotiations for
plaintiff's lack of standing).
197. In re Canada's Landing Requirement for Pacific Coast Salmon and Herring, Canada-
U.S. Trade Commission Panel, Oct. 16, 1989, 2 TCT 7162; see also Shrybman, supra note 157,
at 99.
198. See Shrybman, supra note 157, at 99.
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Metal Producers Committee has challenged Canadian environmental
and safety programs in lead, zinc, and copper smelters as unfair trade
practices under the CFTA.199 Conversely, in U.S. Federal court, both
the Canadian asbestos industry and the Canadian government challenged
EPA regulations that would phase out production, importation, and use
of asbestos as violations of CFTA and GATT.2 "°
Moreover, harmonization as required under CFTA arguably has re-
sulted in lower environmental standards and reduced import protections
at the border.20 1 For example, Canadian pesticide regulations now are
set using the U.S. risk-benefit model rather than the more stringent pre-
cautionary model previously used in the Canadian regulations.20 2 In ad-
199. See PUBLIC CITIZEN, FACT SHEET #3-TRADE Disptmns, at 2. Acid rain, caused
largely by the mixing of sulfur dioxide emissions from human sources with water in the air to
create rain showers high in sulfuric acid content, has been linked to damage to soil, trees,
streams and fisheries in Canada. See Drew Lewis & Williams Davis, Joint Report of the Spc-
cial Envoys on Acid Rain 26 (Jan. 1986). The principal sources of Canada's acid rain problem
are non-ferrous metal smelting plants in Ontario and Quebec, however, Canada receives signif-
icant "exports" of sulfur dioxide emissions from U.S. based industries as well. Id.; John M.
Sibley, A Canadian Perspective on the North American Acid Rain .Problem, 4 N.Y.L. Sct. J.
INT'L & CoMP. L. 529, 530 (1983). To combat its acid rain problems Canada offers financial
incentives to to lead zinc and copper smelters for the purchase and installation of scrubbers
which collect sulfur dioxide emissions. The U.S. Non-Ferrous Metals Producers Committee
has challenged this Canadian program under the CFTA as a non-tariff barrier to trade. See
PUBLIC CITIZEN, FACT SHEET #3-TRADE DIsPuTEs, supra at 2.
200. See Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201, 1209, (5th Cir. 1991) (finding
that Canadian parties lacked standing, despite their GATT rights, to assert substantive claim
that U.S. asbestos regulations violated U.S.'s binding obligations under GATI); see also Brief
of Amicus Curiae for the Government of Canada at 16-19, Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA,
947 F.2d 1201 (5th Cir. 1991).
201. See Shrybman, supra note 157, at 105; PUBLIC CITIZEN, FACT SHEET #3-TRADE.
DISPUTES, supra note 199, at 2.
202. See Shrybman, supra note 157, at 105; PUBLIC CrrIzEN, FACT SHEET #3-TRADE
DispuTEs, supra note 199, at 2. Schedule 7 of Chapter 7 of the CFTA deals specifically with
pesticides. The schedule provides that the U.S. and Canada must "work toward equivalent
guidelines, technical regulations, standards and test methods for pesticide regulation." Canada
follows the precautionary principle in licensing pesticides under the Pest Control Products
Act, and requires the pesticides to be demonstrated as safe prior to registration. See Toby
Vigod, The Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement: Selling the Environment Short, ENVIRON-
MENT (forthcoming 1992) (on file with CIEL-US). In contrast the United States licenses pesti-
cides under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act, which provides a risk-
benefit approach to registration decisions. Id. The parties also committed to working together
to achieve equivalence in "the process for risk-benefit assessment." Moving away from proven
safety towards risk-benefit has weakened Canadian pesticide regulations. See PUBLIC CITIZEN,
FACT SHEET #3-TRADE DISPUTES, supra note 199, at 3; Vigod, supra. Prior to the CFTA,
Canada had registered twenty percent fewer active pesticide ingredients and seven times fewer
pesticide products than the U.S. See PUBLIC CITIZEN, FACT SHEET #3-TRADE DISPUTES,
supra note 199, at 3. Now Canada finds itself having to increasingly accept imports of pesti-
cide products made from compounds that were not among those listed prior to the CFTA. See
id
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dition, a "streamlined" random meat inspection system to further the
CFTA goal of reducing trade restrictions replaced inspection of Cana-
dian meat at the U.S. border.2 "3 A 1990 U.S. Department of Agriculture
proposal to end U.S. meat inspections along the Canadian border as part
of the CFTA2°4 was abandoned in 1991.205
Perhaps the most environmentally devastating effect of the CFTA
has been its elimination of Canadian controls over the exportation of en-
ergy to the United States. 2" Under chapter 9 of the CFTA, both the
United States and Canada have agreed to eliminate regulatory controls
over energy development and trade. To further facilitate the develop-
ment of energy for export markets, chapter 9 also accords special status
to subsidies for oil and gas exploration and development. While energy
development subsidies are protected from challenge, programs that pro-
vide subsidies for energy conservation remain vulnerable to challenge.
The energy development incentives set out in the CFTA run counter
to the intent, if not the letter, of previously-negotiated international
agreements, specifically those concerning ozone depletion and air pollu-
tion.20 7 Moreover, these incentives pose obstacles to ongoing interna-
tional efforts to address the threat of global warming. The CFTA's bias
towards increased energy development to meet rising U.S. consumption
demands has spawned the development of a number of environmentally
destructive Canadian-based energy mega-projects
8.20
203. 54 Fed. Reg. 273 (1989) (to be codified at 9 CFR pts. 327 & 381); see also U.S. GEN-
ERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL REQUESTERS: FOOD SAFETY: Is-
suns USFDA SHOULD ADDRESS BEFORE ENDING CANADIAN MEAT INSPECTIONS, GAO/
RCED-90-176, 1-2 (1990) [hereinafter FOOD SAFETY].
204. 55 Fed. Reg. 26,695 (1990) (to be codified at 9 CFR pts. 312, 322, 327 & 381); see also
FOOD SAFETY, supra note 203, at 1-2.
205. 56 Fed. Reg. 52,218 (1991) (to be codified at 9 CFR pts. 312, 322, 327 & 381).
206. Shrybman, supra note 157, at 98.
207. IMl
208. See id. The two most destructive mega-projects are the Arctic Gas Project and the
James Bay Hydroelectric Project. The Arctic Gas Project entails the construction of a 1,200
mile long natural gas pipeline traversing the arctic perma frost-one of the world's most rare
and fragile ecosystems. Id. The James Bay Project involves the extension of hydroelectric dams
that will "reshape a territory the size of France and flood an area the size of the state of
Vermont." Id The James Bay Project threatens to destroy the culture of the Northern Cree
and Innuit peoples and will have a devastating effect on whales, seals, birds, caribou and other
species. Id at 98-99. In the past, projects like James Bay and the Arctic Gas Project might
have been prevented by Canada's National Energy Board. Today, however, The National
Energy Board's regulatory mandate has been virtually eliminated by the CFTA. Id. at 98.
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III. THE EFFECTS OF ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTIONS ON TRADE
A. Trade Aspects of International Environmental Protections
1. The Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the
Ozone Layer 2°9
The Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone
Layer21O (the Protocol), first negotiated in 1987 and substantially revised
in June of 1990,211 provides for eliminating, by the year 2000, CFCs and
other chemicals harmful to the ozone layer. The consequences of ozone
depletion range from health effects, such as increased incidence of skin
cancer and cataracts, to reductions in yield of food crops.212
The Protocol controls both the production and consumption of
CFCs and other ozone-depleting substances. Several of the Protocol's
key enforcement provisions directly implicate trade.2 13 First, the Proto-
col restricts parties from trading in CFCs and CFC-related products with
non-parties.21 4 Second, the Protocol restricts trade in CFCs and CFC-
related products between parties.21 5 Third, the Protocol contains a
number of provisions assisting developing countries in meeting their obli-
gations under the Protocol, including lengthened timetables for the
phase-out of controlled substances, financial assistance, and technology
transfer incentives.21 6
a. Trade with Non-Parties
To encourage countries to participate in the Protocol and to dis-
courage industries that produce and use CFCs from migrating to non-
party states, the Protocol establishes three tiers of trade regulation in
restricted products between parties and non-parties. The first tier of re-
strictions applies directly to trade in the controlled substances, banning
parties from importing controlled substances from non-parties. As of
209. This section is substantially derived from Donald M. Goldburg, Provisions of tile
Montreal Protocol Affecting Trade (Jan. 16, 1992), CIEL-US Working Paper.
210. The Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer, adopted and
opened for signature Sept. 16, 1987, entered into force Jan. 1, 1989, 26 I.L.M. 1541 (1987)
[hereinafter Protocol].
211. See Dale A. Bryk, The Montreal Protocol and Recent Developments to Protect the
Ozone Layer, 15 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 275, 283-297 (1991).
212. See WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE, WORLD RESOURCES 1990-1991, at 62-63 (1990).
213. See Goldburg, supra note 209.
214. See Protocol, supra note 210, art. 4, 26 I.L.M. at 1554-55.
215. Id art. 2, 26 LL.M. at 1553.
216. Id art. 5, 26 I.L.M. at 1555-56.
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January 1, 1993, parties to the Protocol also may not export controlled
substances to non-parties.217 The Protocol's second tier of restrictions
applies to products that contain controlled substances.21 ' In June of
1991, the parties adopted an annex, which lists products containing con-
trolled substances. 2 19 This annex became effective in December of 1991,
and those parties that did not object must ban import of such products
by June 1992. The third tier of restrictions envisioned by the Protocol
would apply to products made with, but not containing, controlled sub-
stances. The Protocol requires the parties to conduct a feasibility study
on banning imports from non-parties of substances made with, but not
containing, controlled substances by January 1, 1994.20
Because the Protocol phases out trade in controlled substances
among the member states while simultaneously banning the import of
"like" products from non-party states, there is a period during which
non-party states will be precluded from exporting products containing
controlled substances to party states that continue to be able to trade
such products among themselves. Thus, if the GATT contracting parties
apply the Protocol's import restrictions against imports from other con-
tracting parties that are not parties to the Protocol, these import provi-
sions would appear to violate GATT's non-discrimination obligations.211
Similar GATT non-discrimination issues arise from the Protocol's ban
on exports of controlled substances to non-parties. Moreover, should the
parties enact restrictions that apply to imported products made with, but
not containing, controlled substances, such restrictions would be PPM
restrictions that could violate GATT's article HI (governing national
treatment) and article XI (prohibiting quantitative restrictions).'m
Using these trade restrictions to accomplish the Protocol's goals was
discussed extensively during the Protocol's negotiation in 19 87., The
parties agreed to use trade restrictions because they feared that the par-
ties' industries could not internalize the costs of complying with the
agreement while competing with industries in non-party countries that
did not have to bear these costs. In practice, however, efforts to elimi-
217. Id art. 4(2), 26 I.L.M. at 1554.
218. IdL art. 4(3), 26 I.L.M. at 1554.
219. Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, London 1990, An-
nexes A, B, UNEP/OzL.Pro.2/3 at 31.
220. See Protocol, supra note 210, art. 4(4); 26 I.LM. at 1555.
221. See GAT Secretariat, Trade and the Environment, supra note 1, at 11; OECD, Joint
Session, supra note 21, at 23; Goldburg, supra note 209.
222. See supra note 164.
223. See Report of the Ad Hoc Workup Group on the Work of its Third Session, U.N. Envi-
ronment Program, at 17-18, UNEP/WG.172/2 (1987).
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nate the use of CFCs and other controlled substances in many instances
have led to the discovery of less expensive and more efficient substitutes
for these products. Nevertheless, at the time of the agreement, these
trade restrictions were deemed essential incentives to encourage coun-
tries to join the Protocol, and they continue to play a major role in pre-
serving the integrity of the Protocol.
These discussions also addressed the compatibility of these trade re-
strictions with the GATT.2 4 A legal expert from the GATT Secretariat
advised the Protocol's negotiators that these measures would be compati-
ble with the GATT by virtue of article XX's exceptions because the con-
ditions present in the party nations would be substantially different from
those in non-party nations-allowing the parties to draw non-arbitrary
distinctions between products from party nations and non-party na-
tions."2 In light of the findings of the Tuna/Dolphin Panel Report, this
conclusion may have to be reexamined.
b. Special Provisions for Developing Countries
The Protocol contains a number of provisions with trade implica-
tions to assist developing countries in meeting their obligations under the
Protocol. First, the Protocol permits developing countries to delay by
ten years their phase-out of controlled substances.2 26 Second, the Proto-
col establishes a Multilateral Fund to provide developing countries and
their industries with technical and financial assistance necessary for com-
pliance with the Protocol.
227
These special provisions for developing countries could run afoul of
certain GATT obligations, especially in view of the Uruguay Round em-
phasis on eliminating preferences to developing countries.228 For exam-
ple, a developing nation receiving financial assistance from the
Multilateral Fund and then passing it on to its industries to purchase
"clean" technologies could be in violation of the GATT's provisions
against subsidies.
2. Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of
Wild Fauna and Flora
In recognition of global threats to the world's biodiversity, the Con-
224. Id. at 18.
225. Id.
226. See Protocol, supra note 210, art. 5(1), 26 I.L.M. at 1555.
227. See id., art. 5(3), 26 I.L.M. at 1555.
228. See Frictions Between International Trade Agreements and Environmental Protec-
tions, supra note 20, at 20.
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vention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna
and Flora 29 (CITES) seeks to control or eliminate trade in plant and
animal species which are now, or may become, threatened with extinc-
tion. Because the intent of CITES is to alleviate trade-driven pressures
on a species, its trade-related provisions are necessary to the achievement
of its goal.
The level of the trade restriction CITES places on trade in a species
is proportional to the degree of the threat to the species. CITES classifies
each regulated species by its degree of "endangeredness" and establishes
corresponding levels of trade restrictions through a listing system con-
sisting of three Appendices. 30 Parties may propose changes to the cate-
gorization of a species as well as additions and deletions to the
Appendices. 31
Appendix I includes species that currently are threatened with ex-
tinction.2 3' The threat of extinction to an Appendix I species need not be
linked with trade demands on the species. CITES defines commercial
trade broadly to include transactions in the species and species-derived
products that have even nominal commercial aspects.233 Such commer-
cial trade is prohibited. 4 Noncommercial trade is allowed only if mov-
ing the species will not be detrimental to the survival of the species. 5
Before an export country may grant a permit for non-commercial trade
in a species, the import country must issue an import permit.?36
Appendix II lists species which are not currently threatened with
extinction but may become threatened unless trade in the species is
strictly regulated. 37 The exporting country may grant export permits
for Appendix II species where the country's scientific authorities deter-
mine that the export will not be detrimental to the survival of the
species.
38
Appendix III consists of those species that any party has identified
as requiring protection to prevent the species' demise from trade-driven
229. Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora,
Mar. 3, 1973, 27 U.S.T. 1087, 993 U.N.T.S. 243, [hereinafter CITES]. CITES currently has
113 parties. See Fish & Wildlife Service, U.S. Dept. of Interior, CITES Update #12.'-February
1992, at 1, FWS/OMA TRE 1-02g (Feb. 1992).
230. See CITES art. 1.
231. See id. arts. XV, XVI.
232. Id art. HI(1).
233. Id art. I(b),(c).
234. Id art. 111(3).
235. Id
236. Id art. 111(3).
237. Id art. 11(2).
238. Id. art. IV(2).
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overexploitation and for which the co-operation oF the other parties is
needed to control the threat to the species.239 Appendix III listing ap-
plies to only those populations of a species found within those countries
that have classified the species as an Appendix III species.240 Appendix
III listing enables the contracting parties to address localized threats of
extinction to sub-populations of species where these threats do not effect
other sub-populations of the species. Trade in Appendix III species be-
tween parties that have not listed the species as Appendix III species is
allowed so long as a certificate of origin accompanies the species or
product.241
While parties must conform to these mandates, the agreement does
not limit the ability of a party to adopt unilaterally stricter protection
standards. Parties are required to enforce the provisions of CITES in
their dealings with non-parties.242
A number of CITES provisions pose potential areas of friction with
the GATT's obligations. 243 Because CITES allows a party to protect
non-domestic species through trade restrictions, such trade restrictions,
in light of the Tuna/Dolphin Panel Report, would not appear to qualify
for article XX's exceptions for conservation of exhaustible natural re-
sources and protection of species health and life. If the provisions would
not qualify for an article XX exception, then a CITES party imposing
trade restrictions against products of a GATT party that is not a CITES
party could be violating the GATT's prohibition against quantitative
restrictions. 2'
3. The Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary
Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal
To avoid the high costs of domestic disposal of hazardous wastes
caused by stringent environmental laws and regulations, industries in de-
veloped countries increasingly have sought to export these wastes to de-
veloping countries with lower environmental standards. International
negotiations to address the environmental and social implications of this
practice led to the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary
Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal245 (the Basel Con-
239. Id. art. 11(3).
240. Id.
241. Id art. V(3).
242. Id. art. X.
243. See Frictions Between International Trade Agreements and Environmental Protec-
tions, supra note 20, at 21.
244. Id.
245. Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and
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vention). The Basel Convention seeks to control international trade in
hazardous wastes so that baseline health and safety standards are met in
all countries. Because the Convention is intended to restrict trade in
wastes, the trade provisions are central to achieving the Convention's
goals.
The Basel Convention permits the parties' transboundary movement
of hazardous wastes in only three circumstances: (1) where the exporting
party lacks the technical capacity, necessary facilities, or siting capacity
to ensure the environmentally sound disposal of the wastes in question;
(2) where the wastes in question are required as a raw material for re-
cycling and recovery industries in the importing nation; or (3) where the
party performs transboundary shipment and disposal in accordance with
the particular requirements established in the convention. 24
The Basel Convention prohibits the export of wastes to nations that
have prohibited the import of such hazardous wastes, to non-parties, and
to the Antarctic region. Parties that choose to prohibit the import of
hazardous wastes must inform the other parties of this decision.247 Par-
ties may only permit the shipment of hazardous wastes if the shipment is
authorized in writing by the importing country.248 The exporting parties
must provide prior notification of any shipment.249 A party that chooses
instead to allow the import of such wastes must not allow the import of
any wastes that it has reason to believe will not be managed in an envi-
ronmentally-sound manner."5 The exporting party has the burden of
ensuring that any exports of wastes that it permits are, in fact, managed
in an environmentally-sound manner."5
If a shipment of hazardous waste is found to have violated the Con-
vention's terms, then the exporting country must either return the waste
itself or ensure that the exporter or generator returns the waste. If the
return of the waste is impracticable, the exporting country must provide
for its disposal in accordance with the requirements of the convention. 2
The requirements that the Basel Convention places on trade in haz-
ardous and toxic wastes impose conditions on trade in such wastes that
Their Disposal, opened for signature Mar. 22, 1989, 28 I.L.M. 649 (1989) (The agreement will
enter into force May 1992) [hereinafter Basel].
246. Id art. 4(9)(a).
247. Id art. 4(1)(a).
248. Id art. 4(1),(5),(6).
249. Id art. 6(l).
250. Id art. 4(2)(g).
251. Id art. 4(2)(e),(8).
252. Id art. 9(2).
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appear to violate the GAT's trade obligations. 2 " Additionally, because
many of the conditions imposed on exporting countries are designed to
protect the welfare of individuals and the environment in importing
countries "extrajurisdictionally," they would appear to fall outside the
scope of the article XX exceptions. Similarly, the prohibition on exports
to the Antarctic region may not be justifiable under article XX. The ban
on trade with non-parties is most troublesome. For this provision to
come within article XX, the discrimination against non-parties would
need to be justified on the basis of domestic health, safety, or conserva-
tion concerns in the exporting country.
4. Proposed International Agreements
254
The interaction between the spheres of international trade and envi-
ronmental protection is becoming a topic of discussion in a number of
international fora, including the United Nations Conference on Environ-
ment and Development (UNCED) and the inter-governmental negotia-
tions on climate change and protection of biodiversity. This section
summarizes the current discussions within the biodiversity and climate
change negotiations and UNCED, which will culminate at the June,
1992 conference in Rio de Janeiro.
a. The United Nations Conference on Environment and
Development
The UN General Assembly uses UNCED to devise strategies for
reversing environmental degradation while promoting "sustainable and
environmentally sound development in all countries." Envisioned as a
follow-up to the landmark 1972 UN Conference on the Human Environ-
ment in Stockholm, the conference is intended to produce two non-bind-
ing comprehensive documents to guide the world towards environmental
clean-up and sustainable development. "Agenda 21" is to be a plan of
action--covering a panoply of topics from desertification to environmen-
tal accounting-for dealing with environmental degradation and promot-
ing sustainable development over the next twenty years. The parties also
planned to draft an "Earth Charter" that would serve as a set of basic
principles governing human behavior in the biosphere. Discussion of
trade issues in the UNCED process has been limited. Only in the fourth
and final Preparatory Committee (PrepCom IV) meeting, held in New
253. See Frictions Between International Trade Agreements and Environmental Protec-
tions, supra note 20, at 22.
254. This section was substantially derived from a research memorandum prepared by
David Downes, General Counsel, CIEL-US.
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York from March 2 to April 3, 1992, did the parties attempt to deal with
the issues in draft decision documents.
At PrepCom IV, delegates still could not come up with unbracketed
texts. Indeed, delegates could not even agree on "Earth Charter" as a
title for the statement of principles; the draft is entitled the "Rio Declara-
tion." Many major issues remain unsettled. Among the biggest obstacles
to agreement is conflict over the extent to which developed countries
should provide additional financial resources and should take special
measures for transferring environmentally appropriate technology to the
developing world.
In the closing sessions of PrepCom IV, language explicitly dealing
with the interrelationship of trade and environment made its way into
the proposed texts. This language may yet be revised, since informal dis-
cussions of the contents of documents will continue sporadically through
April and May and since delegations will continue to negotiate during
their first days in Rio.
i. UN Background Studies Prepared for UNCED
Two UNCED background studies explicitly discuss trade and envi-
ronment.2"5 The first is a briefing text prepared for government delega-
tions by the UNCED Secretariat on the international economy and
environment and development, which includes discussions of the rela-
tionship of international trade and sustainable development, as well as
several of the major areas of potential conflict between international
trade and environmental law.256 The report begins by acknowledging the
"underlying presumption of trade theory" that trade "at prices which
reflect real resource cost" leads to the most efficient allocation of re-
sources and the maximization of economic welfare generally. 5 As an
aside, it notes that there are exceptions to this rule, including trade in
hazardous products, but it does not assess the validity of measures re-
straining the export of hazardous substances under the GATT."8
The report notes that it is unclear whether provisions in interna-
255. A third background report, focusing on the impact of international environmental
regulation on trade, is being prepared by C&M International Ltd. of Washington D.C., but
was not yet available as of this writing. See LEGAL TIMEs, Jan. 13, 1992, at 5; Telephone
Interview with Offices of C&M International Ltd. (Feb. 5, 1992).
256. The International Economy and Environment and Development: Report of the Secre-
tary-General ofthe Conference, Preparatory Committee for United Nations Conference on En-
vironment and Development, 3d Sess., UN Doc. A/CONF.l51/PC/47 (1991) [hereinafter
UNCED Sec't Int'l Econ. Report].
257. Id at 4.
258. Id
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tional environmental agreements for trade measures against non-par-
ties-aimed at discouraging "free riders" who benefit from the
agreement's success without paying the costs of compliance-are consis-
tent with GATT obligations.2 59 It also acknowledges the related issue of
determining "the appropriate forum for the resolution of trade related
disputes arising from the application of such global agreements."2 60 It
concludes that at least one issue appears settled: that the GATT requires
such trade measures to be "proportional to the environmental objectives
which are sought to be achieved.
'" 261
Regarding domestic environmental laws, the report states that it is a
"generally accepted proposition" that environmental standards may dif-
fer among countries and that therefore "differences in standards per se
cannot be a basis for valid trade restraint. 2 62 It supports this view by
arguing that differences in environmental "conditions" make up part of
international specialization in production and thus contribute to effi-
ciency and to "sustainability."2 6 Obviously, this argument does not take
into account the externalization of environmental costs under one coun-
try's environmental standards that could result in a production process
which, although it produces products that appear to be cheaper, is over-
all more costly and less efficient than production in a country with
stricter environmental standards.
In discussing the trade implications of national standards that regu-
late the process by which a product is produced, :however, the report
concludes that it is reasonable to impose such standards on imports, at
least where the production process degrades common resources and thus
affects the importing as well as the exporting country.264 As to whether
such measures are consistent with GATT, the report merely notes that
GATT does not "explicitly" allow them.265
The second UNCED background study discussing trade and the en-
vironment was prepared at the request of the UN General Assembly by
the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)
for the UNCED PrepCom.266 The report states that "trade liberalization
will induce shifts in production, leading to a more efficient and sustaina-
259. Id. at 7.
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. a d at 6.
263. Id.
264. Id. at 7.
265. Id. at 8.
266. Report of the Secretary-General of the UNCTAD, submitted to the Secretary.General of
the Conference Pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 45/210, Preparatory Committee for
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ble use of environmental resources throughout the world," if "in all
countries production and end-use prices incorporate the full cost of re-
source use (the Polluter-Pays and User-Pays Principles).""26 Thus, a ra-
tional trade policy ultimately may include, for example, increased
intervention in energy markets in order to address global warming.26
By the same token, it will mandate removing some trade barriers that
prevent allocating the real costs of resource use, such as the agricultural
protectionism of developed countries.2 6 9
The UNCTAD trade report urges further study of the interrelation-
ship of trade and environment, including both "the effects of trade liber-
alization on the environment," particularly with regard to removing
developed countries' agricultural subsidies, and the "impact of environ-
mental regulations on trade," including trade-related provisions of inter-
national environmental agreements, particularly in light of developing
countries aspiring to further development.2 70 The report tentatively con-
cludes that trade measures based on environmental grounds should con-
form to three principles. First, they should not result in arbitrary
discrimination between countries "where the same conditions prevail"
and should not serve as disguised trade barriers271 Second, trade-restric-
tive measures should be "proportional" to the environmental objectives
of those measures.27 2  Third, the "precautionary principle"-
"tighten[ing] acceptable risk margins"-should guide the setting of envi-
ronmental standards and "corresponding trade measures" so that the
"lack of full scientific certainty" does not hinder "the prevention of envi-
ronmental hazards."273
It. General Positions of Governments
Although trade policy is an aspect of the "cross-sectoral" issue of
the international economy which PrepCom IV is to consider, in the early
stages, governmental delegations to UNCED have devoted relatively lit-
tle attention to the interrelationship of international trade and environ-
mental policy.2 74 Developed countries, especially the United States, have
the U.N. Conference on Environment and Development, 3d Sess., Agenda Item 2B, U.N. Doc.
A/Conf.151/PC/48 (1991).
267. Id. at 14 (emphasis added).
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. Id. at 15.
271. Id. at 16.
272. Id.
273. Id. at 7, 16.
274. Telephone interview with Tahar Sadoc, UNCED Secretariat (Jan. 3, 1991).
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tended to argue that trade issues should be addressed at GATT. Thus,
the United States has stated that, "We look to the GATT to define how
trade measures can properly be used for environmental purposes., 275 To
the extent that they have addressed the issue, developing countries- in
particular, countries sometimes termed "newly industrialized coun-
tries"-have expressed concern that stringent environmental regulation
may function as protectionist trade barriers, with a particularly negative
effect on the exports of developing countries.276
India, for instance, has argued for strict limits on the imposition of
trade restrictions on environmental grounds, stating that even "global"
environmental considerations "cannot justify restrictive trade practices,
except when these are introduced in terms of specific provisions in a glob-
ally accepted environmental convention. ' 27 7 A UN General Assembly
resolution on UNCED reflects this concern, stating that incorporating
environmental considerations into development policy should not "serve
as a pretext for creating unjustified barriers to trade.9
278
At PrepCom IV, language was inserted into draft documents that, if
approved, would significantly implicate the interrelationship of interna-
tional trade policy and measures for environmental protection. Among
the twenty-seven principles enunciated in the "Rio Declaration," which
was pushed through in the closing hours of the session, was Principle 12
on trade and environment, which expresses a viewpoint with ominous
consequences for global environmental protection.279 Principle 12 begins
uncontroversially by noting that "[tirade policy measures for environ-
mental purposes should not constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifi-
able discrimination or a disguised restriction on international trade."
280
275. Preparatory Committee for the 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Develop-
ment, Statement by the U.S. Delegation on International Economics and Trade, Integrated
Economic-Environmental Accounting, and Economic Instruments (Aug. 1991) (on file with
authors).
276. See, eg., Principles on General Rights and Obligations: Chairman's Consolidated
Draft, Preparatory Committee for the United Nations Conference on Environment and Devel-
opment, 86, 89, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.151/PC/WG.III/L.8 (1991) (statements of South Ko-
rea and Singapore).
277. Id. 1 85.
278. See G.A. Res. 228, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., U.N. Doc. (1989).
279. Late drafts of some sections of Agenda 21 contained similar proposed language. See,
e.g., Protection of Oceans, All Kinds of Seas Including Enclosed and Semi-Enclosed Seas,
Coastal Areas and the Protection, Rational Use and Development of Their Living Resources,
Preparatory Committee for the United Nations Conference on Environment and Develop.
ment, 4th Sess., Agenda Item 2, at 35, U.N. Doe. A/Conf. 15I/PC/WG.Il/L.25/Rev.1 (1992)
(including handwritten amendments "as adopted at Plenary April 3, 1992, 9:30 p.m.").
280. Principles on General Rights and Obligations: Draft Principlsrs Proposed by the Chair.
man: Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, Preparatory Committee for the
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The next sentence reflects the holding of the GATT panel in the Tuna/
Dolphin Panel decision, stating that "[u]nilateral actions to deal with
environmental challenges outside the jurisdiction of the importing coun-
try should be avoided." 2 1 Similarly, the final sentence, drawing once
again from the Tuna/Dolphin Panel's rationale, states that
"[e]nvironmental measures addressing transboundary or global environ-
mental problems should, as far as possible, be based on an international
consensus." This language, taken literally, places an almost impossible
burden on the proponents of international environmental agreements
containing trade-related enforcement measures since it is almost impossi-
ble to achieve an international consensus.2" 2 Indeed, even the United Na-
tions does not include every nation-state.
iii. General Comments of Non-Governmental Organizations
(NGOs)
A number of NGOs involved in UNCED from both North and
South strongly criticize the ramifications of current trade policy trends
for environmental protection and sustainable development. The World
Wide Fund for Nature complained that GATT's "narrow focus" on "lib-
eralization of world trade" blinds it to environmental and natural re-
source costs of traded products that are currently externalized." 3 It
called on the Prepom to analyze the GAT's potential impact on cur-
rent and future international agreements for environmental protection
and to suggest GATT reforms that will ensure that GATT provisions do
not hamper countries' ability to protect the environment and develop
sustainably. 284 The Poverty and Affluence Working Group, a coalition
of seventy NGOs, has also urged that UNCED analyze "how trade prac-
tices distort the environment and development... [and] ensure that envi-
ronmental and development policy [supersede] trade policy" so as to
correct current trade practices that encourage uneconomic and environ-
mentally destructive exploitation of the natural resources of the South.28"
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, 4th Sess., Agenda Item 3, at 4.
U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 151/PC/WG.III/L.33/Rev.1 (1992).
281. Id
282. Although the sentence by its terms includes all environmental measures, whether or
not they pertain to trade, the context within Principle 12 suggests that it is intended to restrict
only those environmental measures that relate to trade.
283. See UNCED Must Recognize Role of Trade (Sept 3, 1991) (press release from World
Wildlife Fund).
284. Id
285. See Third World Resurgence, No. 14/15 at 34 (1991). The term "south" is used to
refer to developing countries and the term "north" refers to developed countries.
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Similarly, in a statement to UNCED, thirty-eight environment and de-
velopment NGOs from twenty-five countries ask that any decisions taken
at the Uruguay Round conform to "the principles of sustainable develop-




Originally, delegations to the PrepCom were to negotiate a conven-
tion to preserve forests, to be ready for UNCED's consideration in Rio in
June, 1992. It is extremely unlikely, however, that anything more than a
non-binding statement of general principles on forests will be ready by
that time. While the discussion of timber trade has raised the issue of the
interrelation of trade and environment more explicitly than in most other
contexts, mutually inconsistent provisions on trade policy in a heavily-
bracketed draft text that came out of the third PrepCom meeting demon-
strate that there is as yet no agreement on how to deal with trade issues
with regard to forests.28 7 Some proposed language would, for instance,
encourage "subsidies or incentives encouraging sound practices," while
another proposed clause would provide that "[t]rade on forest products
must be consistent with international trade law and practices as embod-
ied for example in [GAIT] and its subsidiary agreements. '28 8 Some
NGOs have commented on trade-related issues, with one Malaysia-based
group arguing that UNCED "must ensure that countries reserve the
right and freedom to ban the export of forest products for conservation
purposes, and not support efforts to label such moves as an obstacle to
trade.
28 9
v. Technology Transfer and Intellectual Property Rights
The terms for transfer of environmentally appropriate technology
from North to South have been intensely debated in the UNCED pro-
cess, with little progress toward agreement so far. Developing countries
286. See Third World Network, NGO Statement on Some Key Ifsues for UNCED 7 (Aug.
1991) (statement to UNCED from 38 environment and development NGOs from 25 countries,
drafted at a meeting in Penong, Malaysia, 25-30 July 1991).
287. See, e.g., Land Resources: Deforestation, A non-legally binding authoritative statement
of principles for a global consensus on the management, conservation and sustainable develop-
ment of all types of forests, Preparatory Committee for the United Nations Conference on
Environment and Development, 3d Sess., Agenda Item 3, 114 U.N. Doc. A/Conf 151/PC/
WG.I/CRP/14/Rev. 1 (1991) [hereinafter Land Resources: Deforestation].
288. See id.
289. See Ling & Khor, Principles for an UNCED Consensus on Forests, Third World
Network Briefing Papers for UNCED No. 4, at 16 (1991).
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insist that developed countries must help them obtain the technology
needed to comply with obligations under any new international agree-
ments for environmental protection. In general, they ask that developed
countries make special efforts to transfer appropriate technology by pro-
viding funds and by transferring such technology on preferential and
non-commercial terms.219 Developed countries are reluctant to make
commitments to any more funding, especially in the absence of develop-
ing countries clearly committing to new environmental protection meas-
ures. And preferential technology transfer or funding potentially
conflicts with GATT obligations barring discriminatory treatment in the
form of subsidies.
In this context, developing countries are concerned that protecting
intellectual property rights (IPR), an issue now under discussion in the
Uruguay Round's TRIPS negotiations, may hamper the transfer of envi-
ronmentally appropriate technology. These concerns implicitly conflict
with the United States' effort in GATT negotiations and in bilateral rela-
tions to strengthen IPR protection worldwide,2 91 an effort reflected in the
United States' comments in the UNCED process. 92 A number of devel-
oping countries, as well as many NGOs, also are increasingly concerned
that genetic resources from wild and domesticated tropical ecosystems
290. See, eg., Draft Decision proposed by the Vice-Chairman, Mr. AS Utheim (Norway) on
the basis on informal consultations: Transfer of Technology, Preparatory Committee for the
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, 3d Sess., Agenda Item 2, 1
2(a):(d), 2(a):(g), 8, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 151/PC/L.53 (1991) (bracketed text calling for vari-
ous measures to transfer patents on environmentally sound technology to developing countries
on non-commercial terms); China and Ghana: Draft decision: Financial resources, Preparatory
Committee for the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, 3d Sess.,
Agenda Item 2(c), T (b), (g), U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 151/PC/L.41 (1991) (G-77 proposal on
provision of financial resources and transfer of technology).
291. See Keith Bradsher, US and China Reach Accord on Copying, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 17,
1992, at Dl, D14 (reporting that China agreed to United States demands for strengthened
intellectual property protection); Hans Peter Kunz-Hallstein, The United States Proposalfor a
GAT Agreement on Intellectual Property and the Paris Convention for the Protection of Indus-
trial Property, 22 VAND. . TRANSNAT'L L. 265, 267 (1989); Richard A. Morford, Intellectual
Property Protection: A United States Priority, 19 GA. 3. INT'L & COMeI. L 336, 337-39 (1989)
(describing United States pursuit of improved protection of intellectual property in foreign
countries through bilateral consultations and Section 301 actions under United States interna-
tional trade law).
292. See Preparatory Committee for the 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Devel-
opment, Statement by the U.S. Delegation on Technolology Cooperation (Aug. 30, 1991) (stat-
ing that "[tiechnology has been adapted most successfully in those countries where the
business environment... offer[s] adequate protection for intellectual property"); UN Confer-
ence on Environment and Development, U.S. Statement on UNGA U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 151/
PC/67 "Environmentally Sound Management of Biotechnolology: Background and Issues'
(Aug. 22, 1991) (stating that "intellectual property rights have been key to advances in bio-
technology... [and] must be respected").
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are transferred freely to developed countries, while commercially valua-
ble substances and technology derived from those resources by Northern
industry are rendered expensive or unaffordable for developing countries
by IPR. Some developing countries are calling for the reduction or elim-
ination of IPR, at least in the South, over products derived from South-
ern genetic resources.293
On the other hand, legal and economic scholars, as well as environ-
mental and human rights NGOs and representatives of indigenous peo-
ples, have called for the creation of property rights over biological
resources that would enable governments or individuals with biologically
diverse territory to earn some return from the use of that biodiversity to
create new products-a creative use of IPR-like concepts that many be-
lieve could stimulate preservation of natural resources that are currently
imperilled. Advocates for indigenous peoples also have urged govern-
ments to recognize some form of intellectual property rights in their
traditional knowledge of the biological resources of their natural environ-
ment-so far without success.294
b. Negotiations on a Biodiversity Convention
In a process paralleling the preparations for UNCED, an Inter-Gov-
ernmental Negotiating Committee with a Secretariat staffed through
UNEP is overseeing negotiations on a convention to protect biological
diversity. These negotiations were supposed to result in a draft conven-
tion ready for the consideration of delegates in Rio in June, 1992, but the
betting is fifty-fifty that a convention of any significance will be drafted
by that time.295 In large part, negotiations appear to have snagged on the
same two issues that have hampered progress at UNCED: transfering
technology (although its relevance in the context of conservation of bi-
odiversity is less clear than in other areas) and allocating financial re-
sources for conservation measures.
So far, there has been little discussion of trade issues in the negotia-
tions. 296 Trade policy has arisen only implicitly in discussions of protect-
293. See Land Resources: Deforestation, supra note 287, 1 8(h) (draft of forest principlcs
including bracketed text calling for "sharing of technology and profits of bio-technology prod-
ucts, for example pharmaceutical, derived from [biological resources of forests]").
294. See, eg., Intellectual Property Rights for Indigenous Peoples in the Context of Sus-
tainable Development, Trade, and Conservation of Biodiversity (1991) (proposed resolution to
be presented to UNCED PrepCom III in Geneva).
295. Interview with UNEP Inter-Governmental Negotiating Committee for a Convention
on Biological Diversity Secretariat for Working Group II (January 6, 1992).
296. Telephone Interview with Eleanor Savage, Department Negotiator, United States De-
partment of State (Dec. 12, 1991); Interview with UNEP Inter-Governmental Negotiating
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ing or compensating for the use of developing countries' genetic
resources, i.e., the genetic variety found in wild and domesticated plant
and animal species which may have commercial value in pharmaceutical,
agricultural, and other applications. For instance, the Mexican delega-
tion has suggested that the rights to any product derived from the biolog-
ical resources of a developing country should be in the public domain, at
least in the source country. The fourth draft convention, dated Decem-
ber 16, 1991, reflects this view, providing that "countries of origin of
genetic material or providing genetic material subject to biotechnological
research [should] be exempted from royalties on patents relating to the
products of such research. ' 297 As such a rule would create different
levels of IPR protection for similar imports from different countries, its
validity in light of GATT's prohibition of discriminatory treatment is
unclear. The fifth draft of the convention takes a more ambiguous posi-
tion, including bracketed language providing that contracting parties
shall promote "priority access" to biotechnology for the countries upon
whose genetic resources that biotechnology is based. Whether providing
for such priority access violates the GATT's trade rules would depend on
the nature of the measures taken.298
There are several other provisions in the fifth draft convention
which implicate trade. Article 16 provides that contracting parties shall
facilitate other parties' access to natural genetic resources on mutually
agreed-upon terms and conversely that parties shall promote access for
countries that are sources of natural genetic resources to commercial de-
rivatives of those resources. This language appears to provide for free
trade in biological resources and their derivatives. Bracketed language in
article 17, which covers technology transfer, provides for "preferential
and concessional" transfer of technology-an approach which, as men-
tioned above,29 9 raises questions under GATT standards.
In past years, a number of developing countries have attempted to
restrict the export of plant samples from developing countries to the de-
Committee for a Convention on Biological Diversity Secretariat for Working Group II (Janu-
ary 6, 1992).
297. Fourth Revised Draft Convention on Biological Diversity, UNEP Inter-Governmental
Negotiating Committee for a Convention on Biological Diversity, Art. 17 bis, f 1 [hereinafter
4th Draft Biol. Diversity Cony.]. This draft was prepared for use in the negotiations in Nai-
robi on Feb. 6-15, 1992.
298. See Fifth Revised Draft Convention on Biological Diversity, UNEP Inter-Governmental
Negotiating Committee for a Convention on Biological Diversity, UNEP/Bio.Div./N7-
INC.5/2, art. 20, 2 [hereinafter 5th Draft Biol. Diversity Conv.]. This draft was prepared for
use in the negotiations in Nairobi in May 1992.
299. See supra Part I.E.
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veloped world. These countries are concerned that such exports are be-
ing used to create improved strains of commercially valuable crops that
are then sold back to developing countries at a vastly higher price-with-
out compensing the contributor of the genetic resources.3A" Developed as
well as developing countries have imposed both de jure and de facto re-
strictions on export of plant genetic resources. 30 1 As yet, these trade-
related issues have been addressed through little more than general lan-
guage requiring parties to "facilitate access [for other parties] to genetic
resources for environmentally sound purposes. '3
2
c. Negotiations on a Climate Change Convention
Like the biodiversity convention negotiations, the goal of these ne-
gotiations (organized by an Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee
for a Framework Convention on Climate Change) is to produce a con-
vention ready for delegates' consideration at Rio in June. As in other
UNCED-related contexts, little explicit discussion of trade has occurred
so far. Trade has been implicated for the most part only in the context of
requests for technology transfer on "preferential, concessional and non-
commercial terms," including the waiver of patents as against developing
countries-policies which would raise questions under GATT's prohibi-
tion of discrimination and subsidies. 3  Of particular interest, however,
is that the draft negotiating text includes language drastically curtailing
the possibility of enforcing a climate change control agreement through
trade-related sanctions of the kind employed by the Montreal Protocol.
Article II, Principle 6 of the draft would allow "barriers to trade on the
basis of claims related to climate change" only if based on a decision by
the Conference of the Parties and only if "consistent with GATT. '30 4
Even broader is the language of draft Principle 7, which provides that
"[m]easures taken to combat climate change should not introduce trade
distortions inconsistent with GATT or hinder the promotion of an open
and multilateral trading system. '305 In light of the GATT bureacracy's
300. See Eric Christensen, Genetic Ark: A Proposal to Preserve Genetic Diversity for Future
Generations, 40 STAN. L. REV. 279, 301 (1987) (quoting Mooney, The Law of the Seed: An.
other Development and Plant Genetic Resources, 1983: DaV. DIALOGUE 24, 39).
301. See C. FOWLER & PAT MOONEY, SHATTERING: FOOD, POLITICS & THE Loss ov
GENETIC DIvERsrrY 193-96 (1990).
302. See 5th Draft Biol. Diversity Cony., supra note 298, art. 16, 2.
303. See Revised Consolidated Text Under Negotiation, Intergovernmental Negotiating
Committee for a Framework Convention on Climate Change, 5th Sess., Agenda Item 3, art.
IV.2.3, U.N. Doc. No. A/AC.237/Misc.20 (1992).
304. See id. at art. II, t 6.
305. Id. art. II, 1 7.
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current interpretation of the GATT, such language could seriously ham-
per international efforts to control global warming.
306
B. Unilateral Environmental Protections
Many domestic environmental protections in the United States and
other countries rely heavily upon trade measures to ensure their effective-
ness or to ensure that domestic industries that must meet more stringent
environmental standards are not disadvantaged competitively by these
standards.3 7 Certain of these measures are summarized below.
1. Current Environmental Laws
a. The Endangered Species Act
To friend and foe alike, the Endangered Species Act3°8 (ESA) is one
of the strongest U.S. laws protecting the environment. The ESA is best
known for its provisions proscribing the domestic "taking" of an endan-
gered species or the destruction of such species' habitat.3° The ESA also
bars any person or entity subject to U.S. jurisdiction from importing or
exporting any species listed by the Secretary of the Interior as endan-
gered or any product derived from such a species.310 While the ESA's
prohibitions applying to endangered species generally apply to
threatened species as well, the Secretary of the Interior, through the Fish
and Wildlife Service, may promulgate special rules excepting threatened
species from some or all of these provisions. 31  Listing of a species for
the purposes of the ESA does not necessarily correspond to the interna-
tional listing of a species under CITES. Species listed as endangered or
threatened include both domestic and extraterritorial species, and a spe-
cies need not be protected in its habitat country for the species to receive
protection under the ESA.312
The ESA's import and export bans may conflict with the GAIT's
non-discrimination obligations in terms of the ESA's treatment of dis-
tinct population segments. For these provisions to comply with the
GATT, they would have to be justified under article XX. If, however,
306. See Donald Goldberg, INC Watch Out for GAYTzilla, Eco, Feb. 27, 1992 at 4.
307. See Melinda Chandler, Recent Developments in the Use of International Trade Restric-
tions as a Conservation Measure for Marine Reources, in FREEDOM rOR THE SEAS IN THE 21sr
CENTURY: A NEW LOOK AT OCEAN GOVERNANCE AND ENVIRONMENTAL HARMONY (John
Van Dyke et al. eds., forthcoming 1992).
308. Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1534 (1988).
309. Id § 1538(a).
310. Id § 1538(d).
311. Id § 1533(a)(3).
312. Id § 1533(b).
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the species being protected is not found in the United States, these provi-
sions would seem to violate the United States' GAT' obligations since
article XX has been read as not extending "extrajurisdictionally."
b. The Marine Mammal Protection Act
One of the primary goals of the Marine Mammal Protection Act
3t3
(the MMPA) is to reduce the incidental killing of marine mammals, par-
ticularly dolphins, during commercial fishing operations. To achieve this
goal, the MMPA establishes a regulatory program that sets industry-
wide standards for U.S. tuna fleet fishing practices.314 This regulatory
program is strictest in the Eastern Tropical Pacific Ocean (ETP), where
schools of tuna tend to swim in the waters below pods of dolphin. Under
this program, foreign tuna fishing fleets operating in the ETP must meet
similar standards to be able to import their tuna -to the United States.
For a foreign tuna fleet to be able to export its tuna and tuna products to
the United States, the Secretary of Commerce must certify: one, that the
foreign fleet operates under a regulatory program that is comparable to
that of the United States and two, that during a given period of time the
foreign fleet's adjusted average rate of incidental taiking of marine mam-
mals did not exceed 1.25 times the unweighted average of the U.S. fleet
for that same period of time.315 Additionally, intermediary nations that
import tuna from nations that have not obtained comparability findings
cannot import their tuna and tuna products into the United States.
316
The recent Tuna/Dolphin Panel Report found these MMPA import
and intermediary restrictions to violate the GAT''s prohibitions con-
tained in article III (national treatment) and article XI (quantitative re-
strictions). Additionally, the Panel Report held the MMPA's provisions
to fall outside the scope of article XX because they were both extrajuris-
dictional in nature and not "necessary" within the meaning of article
co.3 17
c. The Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Management Act
The Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Management Act'" a (the
Magnuson Act) establishes a national program for conserving and man-
313. Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972 (current version at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1407
(1988)).
314. Id. § 1374(h).
315. Id. § 1371(a)(2)(B)(II).
316. Id. § 1371(a)(2)(C).
317. See Housman & Zaelke, supra note 13, at 10,272-73.
318. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1882 (1988).
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aging fisheries resources, including domestic, migratory, and anadro-
mous stocks. To a large extent, the Magnuson Act was motivated by
fears that foreign fishing fleets were depleting U.S. fisheries.319 The Act
establishes for the United States a 197-mile-wide exclusive fishery zone
abutting the United States' territorial sea.320
Under the Magnuson Act, trade figures most directly in the provi-
sions govern foreign fleets' access to fishery stocks claimed by the U.S..
No foreign vessel may fish in U.S. waters unless it has obtained a permit
to do so. 321 Foreign vessels operating in United States waters are re-
quired to, inter alia: 1) have a U.S. observer on board the vessel during
their time in these waters; 2) reimburse the United States for the cost of
the observers; 3) take no more than their allocated share of the fisheries
resource; and, 4) abide by all other rules and regulations applying to
them promulgated under the Act.32 The Act requires the Secretary of
Commerce to establish total allowable levels for foreign fishing fleet
catches from U.S. fisheries.323 In establishing these levels, the Secretary
is to look at several factors, including the extent to which the foreign
government helps or hinders the United States' development of export
markets for its fishery products. 324 Foreign fleets that violate the Act's
provisions may be subject to an embargo on all fishery imports to the
United States pursuant to section 8 of the Fishermen's Protective AcL
325
The Magnuson Act appears to establish conditions for trade that
violate GATT's non-discrimination obligations and quantitative restric-
tion prohibition. While these measures at first glance would seem to
qualify for article XX's exception for measures to conserve a domestic
exhaustible resource, to qualify for article XX a measure must not be
applied in a discriminatory or arbitrary manner. Because the Act links
certain of its conservation conditions with what seem to be trade protec-
tionist standards, these provisions may not come within article XX and
thus may violate the GATT.
d. The Dolphin Protection Consumer Information Act
In an effort to encourage consumer-driven, market-based protection
319. Iad § 1801(a)(4); see also MICHEAL BEAN, THE EVOLUTION OF NATIONAL WILDLIFE
LAW 387-88 (1983).
320. 16 U.S.C. § 1811.
321. Id § 1821(a).
322. Id § 1821(c)(2)(D).
323. Id § 1821(e)(1).
324. I
325. Id § 1821(e)(2).
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of dolphins, the Dolphin Protection Consumer Information Act 326 (the
DPCIA) specifies labeling standards that allow qualifying tuna products
to carry the terms "dolphin safe" on their packaging. The DPCIA
makes it a violation of section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act
for any producer, importer, distributor, or seller of tuna products to in-
clude on its label the terms "dolphin safe" or any equivalent statement
unless the manner in which the tuna was harvested meets certain stan-
dards for dolphin protection. 27
The recent Tuna/Dolphin Panel Report decision found that the
DPCIA complied with the GATT because the DPCIA established vol-
untary standards that did not restrict a product's access to the market
and did not provide a government-supplied market advantage.328 In con-
trast, labeling provisions that require an imported product to carry a la-
bel that can only be obtained by meeting certain standards that do not
apply directly to the product but instead to the product's PPM would
appear to violate the GATT's obligations.329
e. The Pelly Amendment
The Pelly Amendment, 330 also known as section 8 of the Fisher-
men's Protective Act,331 seeks, inter alia, to provide a means to ensure
that the unsustainable fishing practices of foreign fishing fleets do not
jeopardize American fishery stocks or harm American fishing fleets. To
provide added protection to American fishing fleets and fisheries, the
Pelly Amendment works in conjunction with certain other American
laws, such as the MMPA and the Magnuson Act, which are designed to
ensure the use of sustainable fishing practices by enabling the President
to increase the trade sanctions against foreign fishing fleets that continu-
ally violate these laws. Under the Pelly Amendment, the President of the
United States has the discretionary authority to embargo all fishery im-
ports from another nation upon notice from the Secretary of Commerce
that that nation has violated one or more of these American laws for a
certain period of time.332
The Tuna/Dolphin Panel Report found that the Pelly Amendment
complied with the GATT's provisions only because the President had
326. Id. §§ 1361, 1385 (Supp. 1991).
327. Id § 1385(d).
328. Tuna/Dolphin Panel Report, supra note 13, at 49-50.
329. See Housman & Zaelke, supra note 13, at 10,271.
330. codified at 22 U.S.C. § 1978 (1988).
331. Fishermen's Protective Act of 1967, 22 U.S.C. §§ 1971-1980 (1988).
332. Id. § 1978.
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not invoked his powers under the Amendment.333 Actually applying the
Pelly Amendment's embargo provisions to another party's fisheries im-
ports, however, would appear to violate GAIT nondiscrimination
obligations.
2. Pending Environmental Legislation
In addition to existing United States environmental laws that impact
trade, a number of pending bills and resolutions raise trade concerns.
Certain of these measures are summarized below.
a. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade for the
Environment Act of 1991 (S. 59)
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade for the Environment
Act of 1991 (S.59) was introduced by Senator Moynihan. It would re-
quire a comprehensive study of the impact of international trade on in-
ternational environmental agreements. S.59 would also require a study
of foreign environmental laws, foreign governments' compliance with in-
ternational environmental agreements, and foreign environmental laws
that restrict trade. Further, S.59 would require the United States Trade
Representative to provide a statement of the efforts being undertaken to
make the GATT more environmentally sound. Additionally, S.59 re-
quires that foreign trade practices diminishing the effectiveness of inter-
national agreements aimed at preserving species be treated as
unjustifiable trade practices under the Trade Act of 1974, and it allows
the United States to adopt measures to retaliate against the foreign
party's practices.
The study provisions of S.59 would in no way conflict with GATT
obligations. S.59's provisions with regard to the justifiability of foreign
actions that diminish international protections of species, however,
would appear to conflict with the GATIT's obligations if adopted.
b. House Concurrent Resolution 246
House Concurrent Resolution 246 (H.Con.Res. 246), introduced by
Representative Waxman for himself and 25 other representatives, would
express the will of the House and Senate regarding the relationship be-
tween trade agreements and U.S. health, safety, labor, and environmental
laws. H.Con.Res. 246 calls upon the President to initiate and complete
discussions within the Uruguay Round to make GATT compatible with
the MMPA and other American health, safety, labor, and environmental
333. Tuna/Dolphin Panel Report, supra note 13, at 43.
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laws. H.Con.Res. 246 also expresses Congress' resolve to reject legisla-
tion implementing any trade agreement, including both the Uruguay
Round and the NAFTA, if such agreement jeopardizes U.S. health,
safety, labor, or environmental laws.
Because H.Con.Res. 246 is merely a statement of congressional re-
solve, it cannot conflict with the GATT. Nevertheless, H.Con.Res. 246's
provisions do raise substantial implications for the GATT and for trade
policy generally. H.Con.Res. 246 calls upon the President to expand the
scope of the debate in the Uruguay Round negotiations, which are well
along and already fraught with difficulty. Moreover, this statement from
Congress that it will not adopt any trade legislation that could under-
mine American social protections places additional burdens on the nego-
tiation of NAFTA and the Uruguay Round instruments. Despite the
concerns of the trade community, adopting H.Con.Res. 246 would be an
important statement that Congress does not intend to allow free trade to
jeopardize the U.S.' commitment to environmental protection at home or
abroad.
c. International Pollution Deterrence Act of 1991 (S.984)
The International Pollution Deterrence Act of 1991 (S.984), intro-
duced by Senator Boren, seeks to level the playing field for international
trade by removing what many perceive to be subsidies to foreign indus-
tries in the form of lower national environmental standards. The goal of
S.984 is to ensure that all products sold in U.S. markets fully reflect their
environmental costs, at least to the extent that U.S. laws require such
internalization.
S.984 amends the countervailing duty provisions of U.S. trade law
to establish that the failure to impose and enforce effective environmental
protections amounts to a subsidy which can be subjected to a counter-
vailing duty. The costs the manufacturer or producer would have to bear
to comply with the U.S. environmental laws imposed on like domestic
products would determine the amount of the subsidy provided by lower
environmental standards. Additionally, S.984 would allocate fifty per-
cent of the monies paid through the countervailing duty provisions to a
fund that would be distributed by the Agency for International Develop-
ment to assist developing countries in purchasing U.S. pollution control
equipment. The other fifty percent of the countervailing revenues would
be allocated to a fund administered by the Environmental Protection
Agency ("EPA") that would assist U.S. companies researching and de-
veloping pollution control technologies. S.984 would require the EPA to
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create an index for the top fifty U.S. trading partners to compare each
country's pollution control standards to U.S. standards.
S.984 would have a number of trade ramifications. Using counter-
vailing duties to mitigate environmental standards subsidies appears to
violate GATT articles I, II, and III, as well as the countervailing duty
provisions of the GATT and the Subsidies Code. And subsidies paid
both to U.S. companies to create environmental technologies and to de-
veloping countries to purchase U.S. environmental technologies could al-
low other parties to institute countervailing measures to mitigate these
subsidies.
3. Sub-National Level Environmental Laws
In addition to the national-level environmental protections implicat-
ing trade, the United States system of governance reserves a wide latitude
of powers to state and local governments to legislate environmental pro-
tections. Certain of these sub-national level protections implicate trade
as well. For example, at least nine states and twenty-five municipalities
have adopted legislation that restricts the sale and use of CFCs as prod-
ucts or in consumer products.334 A number of states have introduced
legislation to control the flow of agricultural research information and
products, including ten states that have enacted controls over Bovine so-
matropin (BST) or beef hormones.335 Hawaii has enacted legislation to
provide funds to help establish and operate small business medical incu-
bator research facilities.336
Many of these sub-national provisions seem to be inconsistent with
the GAT's obligations. As discussed above,337 a recent GAT panel
found that U.S. state laws regulating imported beer violated GATT. 3 1
It would appear that state environmental laws conflicting with the
GATT's obligations would suffer the same fate.
334. See Special Committee on Global Climate, 1990 Annual Report on Global Climate, in
ABA SECTION ON NATURAL RESOURCES, ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, NATURAL
RESOURCES, ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: 1990 THE YEAR IN REVIEW 237 (1991).
335. See Biotechnology Special Committee, 1990 Annual Report on Biotechnology, in ABA
SECTION ON NATURAL RESOURCES, ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, supra note 334,
at 203, 207-10 (1991) [hereinafter Biotechnology Report].
336. H.B. 1144, 15th Leg., 1990 Sess., 1990 Haw. Sess. Laws Act 290 (to be codified at
Haw. Rev. Stat. §§ 137-93; see also Biotechnology Report, supra note 335, at 209.
337. See supra section II.A.2.i.
338. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
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Again, the goal of free trade policy is to allow markets to allocate
the use of resources, while the general goal of environmental policy is to
manage and maintain the earth's resources efficiently. This article has
demonstrated that when the same resources are the subject of both trade
and environmental policies, conflict often results. Yet the ability of both
free trade and environmental policy to accomplish their respective goals
largely depends on their mutual ability to reconcile these conflicts. In
the long term, if economic development from expanded trade endangers
the world's resource base, trade may find itself with no natural resources
left to allocate. Contemporaneously, improving environmental quality
and the standard of living around the globe in many instances requires
economic resources that economic growth attended by expanded free
trade can provide. Moreover, the ability of the global community to
adopt international agreements that encourage state participation and
discourage "free riders" appears at this time to depend on the use of
trade measures within these agreements.
What follows is a brief discussion of certain options to reconcile
trade and environmental concerns and to move each of these disciplines
closer to the mutually reinforcing goal of sustainable development. This
discussion focuses on the legal predicates for and ramifications of these
options.
A. Application of Treaty Law
Perhaps the most obvious question that arises regarding how to re-
duce or eliminate the friction described above is whether there is any way
to reconcile conflicting terms of international trade agreements and inter-
national environmental agreements.339
339. This analysis assumes that GATT is an international treaty. See RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 55, § 301(1)
(defining international agreement). If the GATr is not, in fact, an international treaty obliga-
tion, then the most that could be said for the GATT's role in international law is that its terms,
to the extent that states abide by them, are customary law. See id. § 102 (1)(a), (2); id. cmt. b.
If frictions arise between a customary law, GATT, and an international environmental agree-
ment, the agreement would modify the customary law among the parties, Id. reporter's note 4,
Moreover, because the United States, and other states have repeatedly refused to strictly com-
ply with the GATT, its status as customary law, especially as to these dissenting states, is also
unclear. Id. cmt. d. Regardless of whether or not GATT is customary law, unless the GATT
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Article 30 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties pro-
vides general rules governing the relationship of successive treaties.'
Under article 30, when the provisions of two treaties conflict, the later-
in-time provision prevails as between parties to both unless one treaty
expressly specifies otherwise.341 If a State is party to only one treaty,
then under article 30(4)(b) only that treaty governs.342
Thus, as between States that are parties to both the GATT and the
Montreal Protocol, paragraphs 4 and 4 bis of the Montreal Protocol,
which ban the import of substances produced with, but not containing,
the controlled substances listed in Annexes A and B of the Protocol,
would prevail over inconsistent provisions of the GATT. (This ignores,
of course, the legal opinion the negotiators of the Montreal Protocol ob-
tained from the member of the GATT Secretariat regarding the consis-
tency of the proposed provisions of the Protocol with the GAIT.) Note
that paragraphs 1 through 3 bis of the Protocol presumably would not be
inconsistent with the GATT even when applied against States that are
not parties to the Protocol because the paragraphs pertain to products
rather than processes.
This leaves the problem of non-parties. Specifically, the issue is
whether a party to the GATT can be bound by a subsequent environ-
mental agreement to which it is not a party that contains inconsistent
trade provisions. Article 34 of the Vienna Convention states that a sub-
sequent treaty cannot bind non-party States without their consent.
343
Article 38 recognizes a limited exception to article 34 if the treaty rule
becomes customary international law.344 Thus, a GATT contracting
party that has not signed the Montreal Protocol very well may have a
legitimate dispute under the GATT if another contracting party that is
is an international treaty, it would occupy a lower place on the totem pole of international law
than an international environmental agreement.
340. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969,
U.N.Doc. A/CONF.39/27, 8 I.L.M. 679 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980), art. 30, 8 I.LM. at
691 [hereinafter Vienna Convention]. For a discussion of the problem of reconciling conflicts
between interrelated trade agreements, see Henry L Zheng, Defining Relationships and
Resolving Conflicts Between Interrelated Multinational Trade Agreement The Experience of
the MFA and the GA7, 25 STAN. J. INT'L L. 45 (1988).
341. See Vienna Convention, supra note 340, art. 30, 8 I.L.M. at 691. This rule applies
where the two treaties address the same subject matter-which is generally the only situation
in which conflicts would arise. The date of a treaty for conflicts purposes is determined by the
effective date of the treaty.
342. Id art. 30(4)(b), 8 I.L.M. at 691.
343. Id art. 34, 8 I.L.M. at 693.
344. Id art. 38, 8 I.L.M. at 695; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELA-
TIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 55, § 102, cmt. j (discussing treaty incorpora-
tion into customary law can bind non-signatories).
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also a party to the Protocol bans its products made with CFCs (unless
the Montreal Protocol has become customary law).
B. Application of International Law: Extrajurisdictional Actions
Because the GATT's article XX exceptions now only allow for juris-
dictional actions, there is concern as to who has the .jurisdictional ability
to take actions to preserve the global commons. Under principles of in-
ternational law, such as the Law of the Sea and the Law of Space, juris-
diction over the commons areas is sui generis to the international
community; the international community has reserved jurisdiction over
these commons areas.345 Thus, actions taken pursuant to multilateral
agreements to protect resources in the global commons should fall within
article XX. The Tuna/Dolphin Panel Report recognized this principle
in a very limited sense by allowing parties to act "jointly to address inter-
national environmental problems which can only be resolved through
measures in conflict with the present rules of the General Agreement.
'346
Additionally, it may be argued under international law that unilat-
eral trade actions not specifically provided for in an international agree-
ment are permitted under article XX if they are necessary for the party
to meet its general obligations under an international agreement. 347 For
example, although the Law of the Sea III does not specifically authorize
or provide for trade restrictions, if a party adopts a trade restriction to
fulfill its obligations to preserve the sea, this trade restriction should not
conflict with article XX's jurisdictional requirements.
C. Advancing the Discourse
Obviously, the foregoing analysis is not an adequate long-term solu-
345. See, eg., United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 20, 1982, U.N.
Doc.A/CONF 62/122, 21 I.L.M. 1261 (1982) (noting all rights to the sea are vested in man-
kind on whose behalf the international community acts) [hereinafter the Law of the Sea] (while
the Law of the Sea has not been entered into force, it is accepted by most countries including
the United States as customary international law, with the exception of Part XI governing the
deep seabed); Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and
Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T.
2410, 610 U.N.T.S. 205, arts. I-III (noting that states acting within outer space are subject to
the principles of international law) [hereinafter Space Treaty]. This argument might also be
more broadly phrased to provide that the international community not only has jurisdiction
over the global commons, but also has jurisdiction over the global environment.
346. See Tuna/Dolphin Panel Report, supra note 13, at 50.
347. See, e.g., Law of the Sea, supra note 345 (placing responsibilities for preserving and
developing the high seas on the parties); Space Treaty, supra note 345, art. IX (placing respon-
sibility on parties to conduct their activities in outer space so as to avoid "adverse changes to
the environment of Earth").
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tion. The law of treaties applies only after two treaties or other interna-
tional agreements have come into conflict and so does not help in
avoiding those conflicts in the first place. Moreover, it offers no mecha-
nism for reconciling the legitimate goals of prior treaties with those con-
flicting treaties coming later in time. Finally, and perhaps most
important, it leaves open the question of what to do in disputes where the
States are not parties to both treaties or agreements.
Some individuals have called for a reexamination of various terms,
assumptions, and principles relating to trade and the environment as a
way of at least advancing the discourse, if not reconciling the two policy
areas. A change in any of the following terms, assumptions, and princi-
ples would radically reshape views of trade and environment issues.
1. Internalization of Environmental Costs
Many of the options proposed to date to reduce or eliminate friction
between trade and environmental concerns have focused on modifying
the GATT to permit greater use of trade restrictions to force countries to
internalize environmental costs. Any modification to the GATT must
overcome considerable procedural and substantive obstacles.4 United
States' environmental laws however, increasingly are turning to environ-
mental cost internalization for both foreign and domestic products. Un-
less changes are made to the GATT, these U.S. initiatives could
precipitate additional conflicts.
a. "'Like Products"
As noted earlier, GATT articles I, II, XI, and XX pose obstacles to
using discriminatory tariffs and quantitative restrictions against other
countries' PPMs that are perceived to be environmentally unsound.3 9
These obstacles could be overcome by reinterpreting the concept of "like
products" in the GATT to allow product standards based on PPMs. En-
vironmentalists, who are in favor of allowing environmental PPMs, ar-
gue that the contemporary meaning of "product" includes the product's
life cycle and thus that products with different PPMs are not "like prod-
ucts." For such a reinterpretation to occur, the GATT would have to be
amended, or a side agreement or understanding to GATT adopted, set-
ting out the extensive procedural and substantive requirements necessary
to implement such a program.
350
348. See generally Changing GATT Rules, supra note 7.
349. See supra notes 10-34, 42-61, and accompanying text.
350. See generally Changing GATT Rules, supra note 7.
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b. Countervailing Duties or Antidumping Duties
The GATT in its current form does not view a party's application of
lower standards of domestic environmental protections, allowing the
party's industries to externalize their environmental costs, as a subsidy
(or dumping when the product is exported). As a subsidy, it could be
countervailed by another party whose industries are harmed by the sub-
sidy (or dumping).35 A number of options have been presented to mod-
ify or interpret GATT articles VI and XVI and the Subsidies Code to
permit the imposition of countervailing duties or antidumping duties to
counter such practices.352 Quantifying the effect of differing environmen-
tal standards, however, could pose additional administrative problems
beyond those already associated with countervailing and antidumping
statutes.
2. "Necessary" Under GAIT Article XX(b)
As noted earlier, GATT article XX(b) provides a general exception
only to those trade measures that are necessary to protect human, animal
or plant life or health. One way to permit greater use of trade restric-
tions to enforce internalization of environmental costs might be to give
greater consideration to whether a trade restriction is proportional to its
environmental benefit in determining whether it is "necessary" under ar-
ticle XX(b).353 Many trade specialists argue that this approach repre-
sents a "slippery slope" that would likely spawn a flood of disguised
protectionist measures.354 At the very least, it would likely sharpen the
debate over whether import restrictions based on "consumer preference"
rather than "sound science" are ever legitimate. Environmentalists
counter that requiring environmental protections to be justified as "nec-
essary" places too high a burden on environmental actions and could
diminish the ability of nations under the precautionary principle to act
proactively in the face of scientific uncertainty.
355
3. Harmonization of Standards
The GATT Standards Code clearly demonstrates that harmonizing
standards is a very important goal of the GATT process. Negotiations in
351. See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text; see also Kornoroski, supra note 85.
352. See GATT Secretariat, Trade and the Environment, supra note 1, at 12; OECD, Joint
Session, supra note 21, at 14.
353. See OECD, JOINT REPORT ON TRADE AND ENVIRONMENT II (June 1991).
354. See GATT Secretariat, Trade and the Environment, supra note 1, at 5.
355. See Eliza Patterson, International Trade and the Environment: Institutional Solutions,
21 E.L.R. 10,599, 10,602-03 (1991).
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the Uruguay Round have also made harmonization a high priority, par-
ticularly with respect to phytosanitary and sanitary regulations and
measures. As discussed above, the effects of harmonizing environmental
standards on international trade and the environment largely will be de-
termined by the manner in which harmonization occurs.
356
If environmental standards are harmonized towards more stringent
levels of protection it is possible that certain U.S. domestic laws might
not meet these standards. This would require U.S. environmental pro-
tections to be strengthened. Should harmonization adopt international
standards or a "least common denominator" approach, the United States
would have to weaken many of its environmental laws, a path the U.S.
Congress and state legislatures may find difficult and undesirable.
4. Procedure
a. Dispute Resolution
There have been a number of proposals for improving GATT's dis-
pute resolution procedures, including expanding GATT dispute resolu-
tion panels to include experts from other disciplines such as
environmental scientists and law scholars; creating a "cut-out" mecha-
nism to move trade and environment disputes to an alternative forum for
dispute resolution; and improving the ability of trade panels to take into
account other areas of concern that relate to trade policy, such as the
environment.357 Expanding the membership of dispute resolution panels
to include other disciplines could be achieved under the existing GATT
framework and would provide input as to the non-trade effects of GAIT
decisions. Existing GATT rules, however, would bind these multidis-
ciplinary panels in formulating decisions. Creating new procedures for
dispute resolution that would allow GATT panels to take into account
other areas of concern, such as the environment, could turn GAIT's dis-
pute resolution panels into international overcourts-a role their creators
never envisioned for them and to which they consequently are not well-
suited. Establishing a "cut-out" mechanism for environmental trade dis-
putes would require an agreement of the parties and the creation of a new
international tribunal-a difficult process, to say the least.
356. See supra notes 143-56, and accompanying text; see generally Charles Pearson & Rob-
ert Repetto, Reconciling Trade and Environment: The Next Steps (1991) (paper prepared for
the Trade and Environment Committee of the EPA); Wallach, supra note 95.
357. See generally von Moltke, supra note 92; Patterson, supra note 355, at 10.600; STEW-
ART HUDSON, TRADE, ENVIRONMENT AND THE PURSUIT OF SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT
5-6 (1991).
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b. Transparency and Public Participation
The relative secrecy and isolation in which GATT officials make
decisions concerns many critics. They argue that the GAIT decision-
making process should be more open to the international public so that
individuals and NGOs can participate in GATT decisionmaking by hav-
ing timely access to GATT documents and decisions 3 8 and by present-
ing evidence and arguments to the GATT Council and to dispute
resolution panels. Environmentalists view transparency and public par-
ticipation as integral to the democratic process and to rational decision-
making.35 9 On the other hand, traditional GATT proponents argue with
great force that nations have a significant interest in preserving world
order through negotiated settlements of international disputes insulated
from the influence of publicity. To provide for increased transparency
and public participation, the Parties would have to either amend GATT
or agree to a new understanding or side agreement.
360
5. Trade Restrictions as a Tool for Enforcing Environmental
Protections
Many policymakers see trade restrictions as a legitimate tool for en-
forcing international environmental agreements and even for pursuing
unilateral environmental objectives. Free trade advocates, on the other
hand, argue that trade restrictions are ill-suited as environmental protec-
tion devices.36 1 They point out that imposing trade restrictions increases
international tensions and skews the efficient allocation of resources just
as failing to internalize environmental costs does. 3 6 2 Both, they argue,
reduce overall welfare. They cannot see using one economic distortion to
fight another. Moreover, they find no guarantee that imposing a trade
restriction to force internalization of environmental costs will not have a
greater distortive effect than the lack of cost internalization. Among the
alternatives they suggest are using side payments and trade concessions
to induce adherence to international environmental agreements.363
Environmental advocates respond that the effectiveness of environ-
358. See von Moltke, supra note 92, at 26.
359. See Hudson, supra note 357, at 5-6.
360. For a more complete discussion of the options for increasing transparency and public
participation in GATr's decisionmaking see von Moltke, supra note 92.
361. GAIT Secretariat, Trade and the Environment, supra note 1, at 16, 34 ("judged on
the basis of economic efficency, there are almost no circumstances in which such a trade policy
measure would be the 'first best' tool for dealing with such problems.")
362. See Pearson & Repetto, supra note 356, at 44-49.
363. See GATT Secretariat, Trade and the Environment, supra note 1, at 30-31.
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mental restrictions is a highly complex question that usually is deter-
mined on a case-by-case basis and which does not lend itself well to
generalizations. They note that relatively few methods are available to
nations to influence the behavior of other nations and conclude that ab-
sent substantial changes to the central principles of the international law
and the international order of nation-states, trade measures offer the
most cost-effective means of securing compliance with international
agreements. 36 Moreover, they note that compensation schemes requir-
ing the international community to purchase protections effectively in all
developing countries are not appropriate in every instance, and that rely-
ing too much on these schemes could prohibit environmental protections
from developing effectively.
In an effort to reconcile the trade and environment perspectives, sev-
eral proposals seek to provide frameworks for determining when trade
restrictions are appropriate mechanisms for securing environmental
objectives. These frameworks focus on delineating certain factors, such
as how integral the trade measure is to the environmental protection and
the proportionality of the trade measure to the environmental protection
sought, to help make such determinations. 65
Over the past twenty years, a number of alternative proposals that
do not focus upon trade sanctions as the primary enforcement device
have been advanced for the enforcement of environmental obligations.
Perhaps the most ambitious of these proposals is creating an interna-
tional environmental court, with all nations submitting to its jurisdic-
tion.366 A more recent proposal seeks to facilitate the ability of domestic
and foreign parties to bring suit in domestic courts of all nations for vio-
lations of national and international environmental laws and obliga-
tions. 36 7  These proposals lack substantial backing within the
international community, and so trade restrictions continue to be one of
the more, if not the most, attractive mechanisms for enforcing environ-
mental obligations.
364. See Shrybman, supra note 157, at 108.
365. Id
366. See generally Amadeo Postiglione, A More Efflicient International Law on the Environ-
ment and Setting up an International Court for the Environment Within the United Nations, 20
ENVT'L L. 321 (1990).
367. See Gephardt Proposes Enforcement of Foreign Environmental Laws in U.S: Courts,
INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Sept. 13, 1991, at 3; Convention for the Protection of the Environment,
Feb. 19, 1974, 1092 U.N.T.S. 279 (establishing equal access and remedy legal regime between
Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden); Joel Gallob, Birth of the North American Trans-
boundary Environmental Plainti. Transbounday Pollution and the 1979 Draft Treaty for
Equal Access and Remedy, 15 HARv. ENVTL L. REv. 85 (1991).
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6. Mutually Reinforcing Market-Based Protections
Both the trade and environment communities embrace cost internal-
ization through the "polluter pays" principle and through eliminating
subsidies, particularly those that directly and negatively affect the envi-
ronment. Allowing greater opportunity in the GATT for the parties to
adopt such market-based measures and increasing the reliance on envi-
ronmental policies that utilize market-based strategies may be the most
immediate means to begin reconciling trade and environment concerns.
Caution should be exercised, however, in placing too great a reliance
upon market-based strategies.368 Environmentalists stress that while
market-based strategies are effective for addressing conventional envi-
ronmental threats, markets are not effective in dealing with uncertainties,
such as setting values for natural resources that do not have readily ap-
parent economic uses; in dealing with the risk of irreversible losses that
cannot be countered through the use of economic resources; or in setting
the costs of unconventional threats whose real harms cannot be estab-
lished scientifically with sufficent certainty.
Weighing the need for increased reliance upon market-based strate-
gies against the limitations of such strategies, developing market-based
strategies probably should be facilitated where they apply to conven-
tional environmental threats, such as conventional nontoxic pollutants,
and to the protection of species that are not threatened with extinction.
Where, however, environmental protections apply to unconventional
threats (such as the Montreal Protocol or the Basel Convention on Haz-
ardous Wastes), to irreversible effects (such as CITES), or to resources
that cannot be easily valued in economic terms (such as wetlands or spe-
cies), other protections designed to protect against harms caused by mar-
ket failures should complement market-based strategies.
While market-based strategies increasingly are being incorporated
into domestic and international environmental law, full incorporation of
these strategies in even conventional areas will require substantial change
to United States environmental laws and to the frameworks of interna-
tional agreements. Furthermore, for market-based environmental pro-
tections to be altogether compatible with the GATT, the GATT will
have to be changed to provide the Parties with mechanisms to ensure
environmental costs internalization.
368. See generally Joel Mintz, Economic Reform of Environmental Protection: A Brief Com.
ment on a Recent Debate, 15 HARV. ENVT'L L.REv. 149, 156-60 (1991).
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V. CONCLUSION
The rate of ozone layer loss is now believed to be occurring twice as
fast as scientists estimated only a few years ago. It is estimated that
every year over 50,000 species-over 140 per day-vanish from the face
of the earth.36 9 Over 17 million hectares of forests, an area equivalent to
half the size of Finland, are lost each year.3 7 Meanwhile, the world's
population increases at a rate of approximately 92 million people per
year-roughly the population of Mexico-with 88 million of these new
inhabitants born into the developing world.37 It is estimated that be-
tween 500 million and 1 billion people are under-nourished. 3"
As these figures demonstrate, the world is currently ill-equipped to
suffer either environmental policies that diminish the economic resources
necessary to meet the needs and aspirations of its burgeoning human
population or trade policies that jeopardize the survival of the planet and
its natural resources. Thus, the ongoing and largely polarized debate
over whether trade policies should serve environmental goals or whether
the environment protections must conform to the goals of free trade is
woefully misguided. Both trade and the environment must be disciplined
to serve the overarching goal of sustainable development.
Past efforts at free trade have paid little attention to the goal of sus-
tainable development. Now free trade must become synonymous with
"sustainable trade."373 In principle, free trade seeks to address social
concerns, such as environmental degradation, by applying expanded eco-
nomic resources gained through increased and more efficient economic
activity. But this is no longer sufficent. As World Bank economist Her-
man Daly has noted, "[F]urther growth beyond the present scale is over-
whelmingly likely to increase costs more rapidly than it increases
benefits, thus ushering in a new era of 'uneconomic growth' that impov-
erishes rather than enriches."374 Any growth, including growth from
trade, that is not sustainable must be rejected.
While environmentalists have only recently begun to study trade
law and policy, they are mastering the subject and offering constructive
369. See Sandra Postel, Denial in the Decisive Decade, in LESMR BROWN, STATE OF THE
WORLD 1992, at 3 (1991).
370. Id
371. Id
372. Id at 4.
373. Sustainable trade, as a sub-part of sustainable development, is trade and trade policies
that meet the needs of the current generation without jeopardizing the resource base for future
generations.
374. DALY & COBB, supra note 5, at 2.
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suggestions for moving trade into the parameters of' sustainable develop-
ment. If the experience in the U.S. is any example, however, many in the
trade community are resisting the need to learn environmental econom-
ics, policy, and law. Yet until the trade community makes the effort to
understand environmental imperatives and until they embrace sustaina-
ble development, trade and the environment will remain at odds and the
world will suffer for it.
